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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the puzzle of NATO-Ukraine relations and the uncertainty 
that characterizes the nation’s integration into NATO. Despite Ukraine's pluralistic 
reforms, considerable democratic advances and President Victor Yushchenko's 
continuous assertion of the high priority given Euro-Atlantic integration in Ukrainian 
foreign policy, NATO does not perceive Ukraine as a potential ally. In addition, the 
majority of the Ukrainian population holds a distorted and negative image of NATO and 
objects to the idea that their nation will join the Alliance.  
The politico-psychological realm of international relations theory offers a 
framework to demonstrate the importance of images in NATO-Ukraine relations and thus 
explains the puzzling nature of Ukraine’s relationship with the Alliance. Historically, 
NATO's perception of Ukraine focused on Ukraine's international behavior and foreign 
policy motivations, and this perception affected the forms of cooperation the Alliance 
proposed to Ukraine. Unless Ukraine is perceived as a stable ally, it will not be invited to 
be part of the NATO Membership Action Plan, and the main priority of Ukraine's foreign 
policy–full integration into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions–will remain 
impossible. Being seen as a NATO ally, as well as reversing the Ukrainian public's 
negative view of the Alliance, is a major responsibility of the Ukrainian leadership. 
However, it is also crucially important that Western democracies keep the door open for 
Ukraine. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE 
This study analyzes the role of images in NATO-Ukraine relations, demonstrating 
their influence over the outcomes of domestic and foreign policy. After gaining 
independence in 1991, Ukraine began a gradual rapprochement with the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) just as the Alliance itself reached out to Central and Eastern 
Europe, first with the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and later through the 
Partnership for Peace (PfP). At the start of a new century, Ukraine faces considerable 
difficulties in its pursuit of NATO membership because of the complex link between 
domestic politics and changes in the state system in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Although NATO's Article X presents the possibility of membership, NATO is hesitant to 
invite Ukraine to join the Membership Action Plan, the feature of PfP that eradicates the 
final hurdles to membership. Ukrainian leaders repeatedly assert the nation's willingness 
to join the Alliance, stressing considerable recent democratic advances. Nonetheless, it 
appears that NATO does not see Ukraine as a potential member. The most popular 
explanation for this state of affairs is that NATO is not sure that Ukrainian aspirations to 
join NATO are genuine.1  
More than half of the Ukrainian population holds a negative image of NATO. 
Negative public opinion of NATO can be explained by several factors, including weak 
awareness of NATO, ignorance of NATO's post-Cold War transformation and anti-
NATO propaganda. Given the negative public view of NATO, a national referendum on 
Alliance membership would probably fail. However, Ukraine’s President Victor 
Yushchenko notes, “Euro-Atlantic integration is the priority for Ukrainian foreign policy 
and meets its national interests.”2 Given the inconsistency between the popular image of 
                                                 
1 “Ukraine: Kyiv's Pro-Western Policy in Doubt,” Radio Free Europe, 16 Jul 2006, available from 
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/07/a29ac932-4f29-4a8d-affb-ed8ca08d5d89.html, accessed 11 
January 2007. 
2 “Yushchenko Points Out Top Priority and Strategic Aims of Ukraine,” ForUm, 6 December 2006, 
available from http://en.for-ua.com/news/2006/12/06/150733.html, accessed 26 January 2007. 
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NATO and the priority placed on NATO integration by the national leadership, reversing 
NATO's negative image must be a great concern for Ukrainian authorities.  
The politico-psychological realm of international relations offers a framework to 
explain the importance of images in NATO-Ukraine relations as function of domestic and 
international policy and politics. Tracing the chronology of NATO-Ukraine relations 
since 1991, the thesis explains how such images have shaped the framework of NATO-
Ukraine relations historically, and addresses current images and their influence over the 
Ukrainian aspiration for membership in the Alliance.  
B.  SIGNIFICANCE AND METHODOLOGY  
According to Yushchenko, membership in the Alliance will provide the necessary 
foundation for Ukraine's future as an independent state and active contributor to 
European and Euro-Atlantic security.3 If Ukraine continues to be a “secondary actor,” 
even with “Distinctive Partner” status, the nation risks remaining a buffer zone between 
East and West—a new kind of Zwischeneuropa. This policy could lead to such disastrous 
consequences as the partitioning of the country, or its reverting once again to the status of 
a Kremlin vassal. 
Persistent internal political instability in Ukraine affects the state’s international 
behavior and negatively influences how it is perceived by NATO and its key members. 
The distorted image of the Alliance held by Ukrainian society, which greatly determines 
the national (intra-actor) level of behavior, puts the consistency and sincerity of 
Ukraine’s leadership endeavors into doubt.4 These negative images might block the 
state’s integration into NATO even if all membership-oriented reforms are successfully 
implemented.  
There is a considerable U.S. literature on NATO enlargement, and a smaller 
literature on NATO-Ukraine relations. However, there are significant deficits in the 
literature, as Ukrainian academic writing neglects the role of images in the relationship 
                                                 
3 “Yushchenko Points Out Top Priority and Strategic Aims of Ukraine.” 
4 J. Thomas Price, “Behavior Modes: Toward a Theory of Decision Making,” Journal of Politics, Vol. 
37, May 1975, 11, available from: http://www.jstor.org/view/00223816/di976574/97p04667/0, accessed 22 
August 2006. 
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between NATO and Ukraine. Statements by U.S. officials, Congressional reports and 
other sources depicting the U.S. stance towards Ukrainian membership in the Alliance are 
of special interest in this thesis. The U.S. support of Ukrainian Euro-Atlantic endeavors 
serves as an example, providing empirical evidence of how changes in images result in 
changes in foreign policy. 
In order to explain the choice of the cognitive approach toward the research and 
support the hypothesis, both primary and secondary sources are used in this thesis. 
Various academic works, including material by scholars on political psychology and the 
cognitive approach in political science, are the basis for hypothesis development and 
testing and aid in interpreting the empirical evidence. Primary sources, including 
interview transcripts, Congressional hearings, articles, and statements by NATO and 
Ukrainian leaders serve as empirical evidence in the assessment of the hypothesis.  
Chapter II provides the theoretical background on the politico-psychological 
(cognitive) approach to the study of foreign relations and the decision making process. 
International behavior and foreign policy motivations as “construction material” for 
different types of images are given special attention in this chapter.  
Chapter III examines the emergence and evolution of Ukraine's image since 
independence. Tracing the chronology of NATO-Ukraine relations reveals the factors 
that contribute to NATO's view of Ukraine and how the country's image has shaped 
different frameworks of cooperation.  
Chapter IV depicts and explains the stance of particular NATO members towards 
Ukrainian membership in NATO. Examining the specific views of key NATO powers on 
the further enlargement of the Alliance and Ukrainian membership in NATO helps to 
explain the divergence in their positions. 
Chapter V describes the nature and sources of the distorted image of NATO held 
by the majority of the Ukrainian population. Negative public opinion of NATO is rooted 
in old fears and stereotypes and is nurtured by a widespread anti-NATO propaganda 
campaign in Ukraine. The anti-NATO campaign serves to maintain and increase the 
popularity of particular political parties and organizations in regions of Ukraine where 
 4
ethnic Russians are in the majority. This heavily influences public opinion of NATO and 
makes it difficult for the average Ukrainian to make a conscious, informed choice in the 
referendum on NATO membership. The urgency of the campaign to inform the 
Ukrainian population about Euro-Atlantic integration and its purposes is obvious. The 
current status of this problem is alarming but not hopeless.  
In concluding the thesis, Chapter VI underlines the importance of images in 
shaping the formats of international cooperation and makes recommendations to 
minimize or eliminate the impact of misperceptions about the Ukrainian aspiration for 
membership in NATO. 
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II. THE ROLE OF IMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
AND THE COGNITIVE APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY  
A. POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE COGNITIVE APPROACH  
This chapter provides a theoretical background for the thesis by explaining the 
relevance of the cognitive approach to the study of international relations and its 
applicability to the study of NATO-Ukraine relations in particular.  
The cognitive approach focuses on foreign policy as a “product.” Concepts from 
political psychology are used to explain the role of images, perceptions and 
misperceptions in the outcomes of foreign policy. Virginia Sapiro defines political 
psychology as “an interdisciplinary academic field dedicated to the relationship between 
psychology and political science, with a focus on the role of human thought, emotion, 
and behavior in politics.”5 According to Shanto Iyengar and William McGuire, “the 
cross-fertilization between political science and psychology has risen to a modestly active 
level since its beginnings in the 1940s.”6 James Kuklinski stresses the dramatic growth of 
published research on political psychology during the last decade, noting that “the 
increased influence of psychologically oriented research is undeniable, which renders 
questions about its value to the study of politics even more crucial.”7 Although political 
psychologists are criticized for reducing politics to psychological phenomenon (which 
Kuklinski calls the only consistent criticism of the science8), their methods are workable, 
especially for studying the decision making process in the field of international relations. 
In defining the cognitive approach, Hillel J. Einhorn and Robin M. Hogarth also 
point out its unique niche in the theory of international relations. The cognitive approach, 
they say,  
                                                 
5 Virginia Sapiro, “Introduction to Political Psychology,” Political Science 267, 2000, available from 
http://www.polisci.wisc.edu/users/sapiro/ps267/ps267.htm, accessed 28 August 2006. 
6 Shanto Iyengar and William J. McGuire, Explorations in Political Psychology (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 1993), 26. 
7 James H. Kuklinski, Thinking about Political Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), 9. 
8 Kuklinski, 9. 
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assumes a complex, and realistic, psychology about human reasoning and 
decision-making. Humans and policy makers are cognitive actors. To 
understand and predict behavior, we have to deal with the realities of 
human rationality, that is, with bounded rationality. Therefore the process 
of cognition goes beyond the pure concept of rationality in actors’ 
behavior presented by the realist camp in the science of international 
relations and thus helps to explain the decisions, which can seem irrational 
from their point of view.9 
Scholars compare such situations with molecules that seem not to follow the laws 
of physics, and thus require a closer look.10 According to political psychologists, 
behavior is one of the determinants of the images that appear and evolve in actors’ 
system of beliefs. The system of beliefs, including images, serves as a filter through 
which the “drafts” of the decision pass and take shape.  
B.  IMAGES, BEHAVIOR AND MOTIVATIONS 
It is obvious that the images or perceptions of an actor held by others are shaped 
in their belief system by judgments they make of the actor’s behavior. At the same time, 
awareness of the actor’s motivations is indispensable for analyzing the actor’s behavior. 
Therefore, the analysis of images in the sphere of international relations must be 
supported by a parallel analysis of the important determinants of those images–
international behavior and foreign policy motivations. 
Thomas Price puts the notion of “behavior” into the framework of interaction.11 
For him, “the forms of interaction are divided into two categories (levels): interactor and 
intra-actor.”12 International behavior is represented as an interactor level of interaction. 
The second level, the intra-actor level, is a “nation-individual level of interaction, or 
interaction between a government and its citizens.”13 The actor (the foreign policy 
                                                 
9 Kuklinski, 9.  
10 Hillel J. Einhorn and Robin M. Hogarth, “Behavioral Decision Theory: Process of Judgment and 
Choice,” 1981, available from 
http://arjournals.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.ps.32.020181.000413, accessed 22 August 
2006. 
11 Price, 11. 
12 Price, 11. 
13 Price, 11. 
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maker) “is dependent on the nation and is a subject to the nation’s jurisdiction.”14 Given 
the subject of this thesis, this approach deserves special attention. Membership in NATO 
has been declared a major priority of Ukrainian foreign policy. However, the national 
(intra-actor) level of behavior (persistent negative public opinion toward NATO) 
contradicts the international (interactor) level of behavior, which puts its consistency, 
persistence, and the overall sincerity into doubt. 
Behavior is driven by motivations. As Richard W. Cottam says,  
motivations in foreign policy represent a compound of factors that 
predispose a government and people to move in a decisional direction in 
foreign affairs… Motivations in foreign policy should be approached by 
developing a predispositional base, or list of needs, the satisfaction of 
which predisposes an  actor toward various action patterns.15 
One of the best known criticisms of studying motivations comes from the 
“anthropologist” of realist theory in international relations, Hans Morgenthau, who 
argues that “individual motivations for the international analyst are unknowable and 
hence a subject better avoided.”16 Cottam answers by arguing that, “although H. 
Morgenthau rejected the importance of studying the individual motivations, his 
prescriptions are founded on motivational assumptions that are basic to his entire thought: 
that collective man, like individual man, is power driven.”17  
The importance of images and perceptions (and misperceptions) in international 
relations may be considered the stronghold of the politico-psychological approach. The 
most obvious proof of the importance of images can be found in the study of international 
conflict and conflict resolution. In this context, R. William Ayres points out that  
 
 
                                                 
14 Price, 11. 
15 Price, 32. 
16 Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Knopf, 
1973), 6. 
17 Richard W. Cottam, Foreign Policy Motivation: A General Case Study (Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburg Press, 1977), 31. 
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“breaking down the stereotypes and images which conflicting parties hold of each other 
is one, if not the main task for the process of conflict mediation.”18 He states that  
by bringing conflicting parties together, providing clearer communication 
of each side’s views, allowing the airing of grievances, etc., they will 
begin to view each other less as adversaries and more as partners … 
Change in perceptions leads to a lowering of barriers to conflict 
settlement.19  
To provide a good example of the role of images, Ayres narrows his research to 
one type of the image–the image of the “enemy.” Studies of the enemy image are among 
the most powerful from the first generation of scholarship in political psychology. One of 
its most famous representatives, Ole Holsti, believes that “the concept of the enemy 
helped to end and sustain international conflict over time.”20 However, although 
important, the image of the enemy is not the only one that deserves careful attention. 
Richard K. Herman and Michael P. Fischerkeller argue that while the study of images is 
valuable for the field of international relations theory, “theories of image that rest only on 
the enemy concept lack the analytical tools with which to make the differentiations 
between threat- and opportunity based motivational compound.”21 They propose a 
broader theory of “ideal images” that capture five different types of strategic perception: 
images of enemy, degenerate, colony, imperialist and ally.22  
Images are complex. The types of perceptions represent five ideal images, 
meaning that no perception of foreign relations actors can be limited to only one image. 
Nevertheless, the image of the ally is most stressed in this thesis. While the thesis argues 
that mutual perception and images in the sphere of NATO-Ukraine relations represent 
                                                 
18 R. William Ayres, “Mediating International Conflicts: Is Image Change Necessary?” Journal of 
Peace Research, Vol. 34, November 1997, 3, available from 
http://jpr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/34/4/431, accessed 28 August 2006. 
19 Ayres, 2. 
20 Laura Neack, Jeanne A. K. Hey and Patrick J. Haney, Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and 
Change (Oxford, OH: Miami University Press, 1995), 55. 
21 Richard K. Hermann and Michael P. Fischerkeller, “Beyond the Enemy Image and Spiral Model: 
Cognitive Strategic Research After the Cold War,” International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3, Summer 
1995, 416, available from http://www.jstor.org/view/00208183/dm980291/98p0181k/0, accessed 28 
August 2006. 
22 Hermann and Fischerkeller, 426. 
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important obstacles to the state’s integration into the Alliance, it is also important to 
recognize the types of motivations and behavior by both parties that impede Ukraine's 
acquisition of the image of “ally” in the eyes of NATO—an image which it needs for 
successful integration into the Alliance.  
C. THE IMPORTANCE OF MINIMIZING MISPERCEPTIONS 
In Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Robert Jervis raises an 
argument for the necessity of minimizing misperceptions in order to make more grounded 
decisions in the sphere of international relations. In his view, a decision maker should be 
extremely vigilant because of the costs of various kinds of misperception.23 
The reluctance of specific NATO members to recognize the changes in Ukraine 
and support Ukrainian Euro-Atlantic integration endeavors provide empirical support for 
Jervis's argument. The ambivalence of France and Germany about the type of relations 
they want with Ukraine is a good example. Their reluctance to see Ukraine as a future 
member of NATO and the European Union (EU) and to provide their support is 
explained by their unwillingness to damage relations with Russia. Although it makes 
sense to avoid annoying Russia (and risking the loss of considerable economic and 
energy benefits), there are other undesirable consequences of choosing the wrong policy. 
First, without their important political and economic assistance to help Ukraine integrate 
into the family of Western democracies, the risk that Ukraine will return to the Russian 
orbit is high. A resurgence of Russian political, economic and military domination on the 
western borders of Ukraine and eastern borders of the EU is definitely not seen as 
desirable. Second, further marginalization of the Ukrainian democracy would undermine 
the EU's principle of promoting democracy and raise the question of the “finalité 
Européenne” in general.24  
 
                                                 
23 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1976), 424. 
24 See “The EU's Human Rights and Democratization Policy: Funding Activities to Promote Human 
Rights and Democratization,” available from 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/human_rights/intro/index.htm#9, accessed 14 January 2006. 
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Therefore, for research purposes this thesis concentrates on the emergence of the 
initial images of independent Ukraine and NATO in 1991, the evolution of those images, 
and their influence on the framework of NATO-Ukraine relations. The analysis of 
different NATO perceptions of Ukraine, Ukraine’s foreign policy motivations and its 
international behavior during different historical periods helps explain the different 
formats of cooperation that NATO proposed to Ukraine. Also examined are specific 
NATO members' foreign policy motivations and international behavior which affect 
NATO’s image in the eyes of Ukrainian society. 
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III. THE IMAGE OF UKRAINE AND ITS IMPACT ON NATO-
UKRAINE RELATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION  
An analysis of the roots and the character of foreign policy motivations and 
international behavior of Ukraine during different periods allows judgments on the 
international image of the state. This chapter traces the chronology of NATO-Ukraine 
relations and explains how different views on Ukraine conditioned the formats of 
cooperation proposed by the Alliance. This chapter demonstrates that Ukraine’s readiness 
to meet the criteria of NATO membership will not guarantee the state membership if it is 
not perceived as stable NATO ally.  
B. INITIAL IMAGE OF INDEPENDENT UKRAINE  
It would be a mistake to say that the initial format of NATO-Ukraine relations 
was shaped by the Alliance's image of the newly independent state. However, for the 
following reasons this fact does not undermine the main argument of this thesis. First, 
NATO-Ukraine relations began in 1992, when Ukraine joined the North Atlantic 
Cooperation Council (NACC), which was NATO’s initiative for all non-NATO European 
countries, including Ukraine. Second, the emergence of an independent Ukraine was not 
accompanied by a clear and specifically “Ukrainian” image which influenced its relations 
with NATO. Third, the decision to join the NACC was not based on clearly identified 
specifically “Ukrainian” national priorities and motivations for international security. 
Such foreign policy priorities and motivations were simply not identified.  
The lack of clear foreign policy motivations is among the indicators of a 
“degenerate” image, according to the classification proposed by Hermann and 
Fischerkeller.25 The degenerate image characterizes states where “leaders are more 
concerned with preserving what they have than with a vision for the future, states are less 
strong than they could be, and decision making is confused.”26 Although Ukraine did not 
                                                 
25 Hermann and Fischerkeller, 428. 
26 Hermann and Fischerkeller, 428. 
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fit this image perfectly, the state faced a number of domestic problems which did prevent 
it from elaborating an effective and fruitful foreign policy strategy.  
Along with a deep socioeconomic crisis after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
Ukraine inherited a set of problems which required considerable resources to resolve. 
Ukraine was practically left on its own with the consequences of the 1986 Chernobyl 
catastrophe, which required 20 percent of the limited Ukrainian budget to clean up 
contaminated areas.27 Considering other factors like radiation and related diseases 
affecting almost 10 percent of the population, contamination of 2.45 million square 
hectares of fertile soil, and the like, it is hard to imagine how Ukraine, struggling with a 
deep economic crisis, could manage the situation.28  
At the same time, the Chernobyl catastrophe and its disastrous consequences were 
among the main reasons for Ukrainian authorities' unprecedented decision to get rid of 
the nuclear arsenal they had inherited from the former Soviet Union, the third world’s 
largest. Although the initiative was supported financially by international donors, its 
implementation required considerable allocations from the state budget. In addition, 
Ukraine inherited 900,000 military personnel and abundant surplus military equipment 
from the Soviet Union. The necessity of maintaining and at the same time reducing such 
a huge military force also required considerable financial outlays, again from the scarce 
national budget. And these are only the major problems that Ukraine faces since its 
independence.  
These and other difficulties characterized the conditions under which Ukraine 
established statehood and created preconditions for its further participation in the 
European security architecture. In addition, the state’s ability to conduct independent 
foreign policy was very restricted. The Ukrainian state apparatus was manned almost 
completely by former Soviet Ukrainian communist elites. The new generation of 
Ukrainian politicians and diplomats was just emerging and did not participate in state 
building. 
                                                 
27 “Chernobyl 'Costs'” available from http://www.ecn.cz/c10/costs.html, accessed 14 February 2006. 
28 “Chernobyl, Ukraine” available from http://www.blacksmithinstitute.org/site10a.php, accessed 14 
February 2006. 
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As a consequence, the Ukrainians saw NATO and its enlargement as similar, if 
not identical to, the position of Russia, upon whom Ukraine had been politically and 
economically dependent. The Ukrainian First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs stated 
in 1993, with regard to NATO expansion, “the later, the better.”29 Despite the fact that 
Ukraine on a number of occasions expressed concern about NATO enlargement, the 
Alliance prepared to expand into Central and Eastern Europe, and Ukraine was not a 
candidate for membership.30  
Therefore, the formation of an initial image of independent Ukraine by NATO 
was influenced by Ukrainian foreign policy's lack of clear motivations, priorities and 
strategy. Ukraine's obscure motivations and attempts to balance between East and West 
(so-called “multi-vector foreign policy”) are explained by the country's dependence on 
Western financial donor states on the one hand, and Russian energy resources on the 
other. Although Ukraine did not perfectly fit the degenerate image as defined by 
Hermann and Fischerkeller, the state’s image at the time did share many characteristics of 
the degenerate type.  
C. UKRAINE'S IMAGE CHANGES WITH THE PARTNERSHIP FOR 
PEACE PROGRAM  
In 1994, Ukraine joined the “Partnership for Peace” (PfP). Two facts about this 
deserve special attention. First, this was the first independent decision by Ukrainian 
authorities in regard to relations with NATO. Ukraine became the first member of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States to join a major program for practical security and 
defense cooperation with NATO and individual Partner countries, earlier even than 
Russia.31 Second, official Kyiv provided NATO authorities with a Presentation  
 
 
                                                 
29 “Materials for the DC Meeting on 15 September 1993,” Oxman to Undersecretary Peter Tarnoff 
“Your Deputies’ Meeting on the NATO Summit, Wednesday, 15 September 1993, 11.00 A.M., 14 
September 1993.  
30 Basic Papers on International Security Policy, April 1996, no. 16, available from 
http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/BP16.htm, accessed 31 July 2006. 
31 “NATO-Ukraine Cooperation: Security Cooperation and Support for Reform,” 20 December 2006, 
available from http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-ukraine/index.html, accessed 22 December 2006. 
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Document in which the political goals of Ukraine's participation in PfP were determined, 
together with arrangements to achieve these goals using means and powers allocated by 
Ukraine for participation in PfP.  
Practically, this means it is possible to distinguish Ukraine's motivations in its 
foreign policy towards NATO since 1994. The motives can be discerned from the 
provisions of both the PfP Framework Document and the Ukrainian Presentation 
Document signed by the state leadership. Having signed the PfP Framework Document, 
Ukraine “resolved to deepen its political and military ties and to contribute further to the 
strengthening of security within the Euro-Atlantic area,” recognizing that “stability and 
security in the Euro-Atlantic area can be achieved only through cooperation and common 
action.”32 The first Individual Partnership Program between NATO and Ukraine was 
established the same year. It consisted of practical events for cooperation in international 
security oriented toward concrete goals and results. 
Cooperation with NATO within the Partnership for Peace Program opened a lot of 
opportunities for Ukraine. It was a unique opportunity for Ukraine to develop its own 
policy toward one of the most important security organizations in Europe and the world, 
independently defining the goals of cooperation and implementing them. This greatly 
contributed to the reaffirmation of Ukraine as an independent state capable of conducting 
its own foreign policy.  
With the emergence of Ukraine's clear foreign policy motivations regarding 
NATO, it became possible to judge the state's behavior, which, in turn, contributed to 
how Ukraine was perceived by NATO. The seriousness of Ukrainian intent was 
reinforced by the state’s actual behavior. For example, in 1995, the year after Ukraine 
joined the PfP program, the Ukrainian Army's 240th Special Forces Mechanized Infantry 
Battalion went to Sarajevo for the peacekeeping mission. This made Ukraine a force 
contributor to the NATO-led operation to carry out the UN resolution in the former 
Yugoslavia (Implementation Force, IFOR, 1995-1996 in Bosnia and Herzegovina). Later, 
                                                 
32 Partnership for Peace: Framework Document issued by the Heads of State and Government 
participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 10 January 1994, available from 
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b940110b.htm, accessed 15 December 2006. 
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Ukraine contributed a mechanized infantry battalion to the Stabilization Force (SFOR) 
and made available a helicopter squadron. This was not Ukraine's first peacekeeping 
experience since independence, but it was the first time the Ukrainian Armed Forces 
performed missions within the NATO format and according to NATO operational 
procedures. 
The initiation of practical cooperation between NATO and Ukraine based on 
clearly defined foreign policy motivations eliminated the near-degenerate image of 
Ukraine held by NATO. For NATO, Ukraine became a contributor, a state which 
implemented important security tasks in cooperation with the Alliance. For Ukraine, 
cooperation with NATO became an important direction for foreign policy and 
contributed to stability in the area, which is only 400 kilometers from the Ukrainian 
border.  
Ukraine’s participation in the Partnership for Peace Program and the concrete 
results of its cooperation with NATO reaffirmed Ukraine as an independent international 
actor with a foreign policy supported by clear motivations and appropriate international 
behavior. This, in turn, contributed to the evolution of the image of Ukraine in the eyes of 
NATO. An earlier image, unclear, close to degenerate, was replaced by a new image—
the image of a “partner.”  
D. ROLE OF THE CHARTER ON A DISTINCTIVE PARTNERSHIP 
(MADRID, 1997) 
After the fruitful and mutually beneficial relationship that began with the PfP 
program, NATO changed its perception of Ukraine. Ukraine's new image as a partner and 
its appropriate international behavior pushed the Alliance to seek enhanced cooperation 
with the state. Its strategic geographic location, considerable military potential and strong 
political will to develop as a democratic state also played an important role in this regard.  
In 1997 NATO Secretary General Xavier Solana said, in a statement preceding 
the signing of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine in 
Madrid on July 9, 1997, 
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The Alliance acknowledges that Ukraine has an important and even 
unique place in the European security order. An independent democratic 
and stable Ukraine is  one of the key factors of stability and security in 
Europe. Its geographical position gives it a major role and responsibility. 
NATO attaches a special importance to its relationship with Ukraine.33  
After the Charter was signed Ukraine entered a new era of cooperation with 
NATO. This cooperation was specifically shaped for Ukraine and was influenced by the 
evolution of the Ukrainian image held by NATO. Of course, the strategic geographic 
location of Ukraine, its political and military potential played an important role. But 
again, the status of a distinctive partner and the benefits related to this status could not 
become a reality without positive changes in how Ukraine was perceived.  
Two facts support this argument and thus the main hypothesis of this paper. First, 
in 1992, when Ukraine joined North Atlantic Cooperation Council, it had the same 
geographic location and potential for becoming an active contributor to stability in the 
Euro-Atlantic security area. However, NATO did not propose any cooperation 
specifically shaped for Ukraine at that time because the future of Ukraine and its foreign 
policy priorities and motivations were unclear. Second, Ukraine's clear foreign policy 
motivations, supported by appropriate international behavior, were recognized by NATO 
and became preconditions for offering the status of Distinctive Partner in 1997. As stated 
in the Charter, NATO  
welcome[s] the progress achieved by Ukraine and look[s] forward to 
further steps to develop its democratic institutions, to implement radical 
economic reforms, and to deepen the process of integration with the full 
range of European and Euro-Atlantic structures.34  
 
 
                                                 
33 Xavier Solana, NATO Secretary General, Speech at the Madrid Summit, 7 May 1997, available 
from  http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1997/s970507a.htm, accessed 30 January 2006. 
34 Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine, 
Madrid, 9 July 1997, available from http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/ukrchrt.htm, accessed 30 January 
2006. 
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Therefore, NATO recognized Ukraine's progress. Noting in the same document 
its appreciation of Ukraine's active cooperation with IFOR/SFOR and other peacekeeping 
operations in the former Yugoslavia, NATO underlined the importance of the state’s 
international behavior.35 
To summarize, NATO’s proposal to further develop its relationship with Ukraine 
based on distinctive partnership principles resulted from NATO's recognition of 
Ukraine’s clear foreign policy motivations and appropriate international behavior. As 
noted above, a state’s foreign policy motivations and international behavior are important 
determinants of its image. Therefore, the change in the relationship between NATO and 
Ukraine and the signing of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership were influenced by 
the changing image of Ukraine from a near-degenerate state to a partner.  
E.  FROM MADRID TO PRAGUE: UKRAINE DECLARES ITS DESIRE TO 
JOIN NATO (2002) 
The next important event in NATO-Ukraine relations came on May 23, 2002, 
when the Secretary of the Ukrainian National Defense and Security Council, Yevhen 
Marchuk, announced Ukraine's intention to seek NATO membership. Although the 
possibility of Ukrainian membership in the Alliance had already been discussed by 
various interested groups, this announcement by a high Ukrainian official was 
unexpected. Ukraine's ambitions were given a cautious welcome when NATO Secretary 
General Lord George Robertson, head of a North Atlantic Council delegation, arrived in 
Kyiv on July 9; however, Robertson warned that “membership was at least five years 
away.”36 NATO-Ukraine relations in 2002 were far from those typical of potential allies, 
and the image of Ukraine held by NATO was far from the image of an ally.  
In fact, after the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership was signed, NATO-Ukraine 
cooperation was significantly enhanced and brought even more valuable results. Sessions 
of the NATO-Ukraine Commission, conducted at least twice each year in the format 
“NATO plus Ukraine”, became a unique forum for consultations that greatly contributed 
                                                 
35 Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine.  
36 East European Constitutional Review, Volume 11, Number 3, Summer 2002, available 
from http://www.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol11num3/constitutionwatch/ukraine.html, accessed 20 June 2006. 
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to building confidence and increasing transparency in NATO-Ukraine relations. For 
NATO, Ukraine ceased to represent an area of uncertainty, and “[s]trong, independent, 
stable and democratic Ukraine became a cornerstone of Euro-Atlantic security.”37 For 
Ukraine, the Charter opened opportunities to get Alliance assistance in different spheres 
of state development and reaffirmed Ukraine's role as a key European actor in the 
security sphere. The new framework of cooperation allowed the conduct of a number of 
activities in the “NATO plus Ukraine” format, including joint seminars, working groups 
and meetings on topics such as civil emergency planning and disaster preparedness, civil-
military relations, democratic control of the armed forces, defense planning, budgeting, 
policy, strategy, national security concepts and defense conversion. Ukrainian endeavors 
to develop as a stable, independent, and democratic state were welcomed and greatly 
supported by NATO.38 
While Ukraine received valuable assistance from NATO, it also made active 
contributions to Euro-Atlantic security. NATO benefited from Ukraine's expertise in 
science and its contributions to peacekeeping efforts in the Balkans.39 Ukrainian 
contributions to international peacekeeping missions in the former Yugoslavia provide a 
clear example. 
 
Period Missions Forces Contributed 
1992 – 1995 UNPROFOR 
240th Detached Special Battalion 
60th Detached Special Battalion 
40th Operative Group of staff officers 
Military Police Unit 
Group of Military Observers since 1995 
1995 – 1999 IFOR/SFOR 240th Detached Special Battalion 
1996 – 1998 
UN Mission to 
Eastern 
Slavonia 
17 Detached Helicopter Squadron 
70 Detached Armored Company 
64 Detached Special Mechanized Company 
8 Detached Helicopter Squadron 
15 Detached Helicopter Unit 
 
                                                 
37 NATO and Ukraine – Distinctive Partners. 
38 NATO and Ukraine – Distinctive Partners. 
39 NATO and Ukraine – Distinctive Partners. 
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contingent within the Ukrainian- 
Polish Battalion in Kosovo) 
Source: The History of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Participation in Peacekeeping 
Operations http://www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?lang=en&part=peacekeeping&sub=history  
 
Table 1.   Ukrainian Forces Contribution to International Peace-keeping Operations on the 
Territory of Former Yugoslavia.40 
 
The new cooperation format created unique opportunities that Ukraine used for its 
rapprochement with NATO. The Ukrainian military performed their missions in close 
cooperation with their NATO colleagues. In the case of KFOR missions in Kosovo, the 
Ukrainian military acquired valuable experience of interoperability with NATO forces as 
a part of UKRPOLBAT. The foreign policy motivations of Ukraine, its dedication to 
insuring regional peace and stability and its international behavior all contributed to its 
new image of a strategic partner and potential ally.  
However, Ukraine's active rapprochement with NATO lost momentum after 2000, 
when it faced both internal and external obstacles. Power shifts in Russia and Vladimir 
Putin’s presidency marked the beginning of considerable changes in Russian foreign 
policy, including its policy toward NATO enlargement. Under the Russian presidency of 
Boris Yeltsin, from 1991 to 1999, Ukraine, with its heavy economic dependence on 
Russian energy resources, did not face serious obstacles in developing an independent 
foreign policy towards NATO. Yeltsin did not object strongly to the first wave of NATO 
enlargement at the end of the Cold War, which incorporated the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland, and he did not interfere in NATO-Ukraine relations. When Putin, 
less tolerant of NATO, came to power, Russian energy supplies to Ukraine became a tool 
to influence Ukrainian foreign policy. Therefore, starting in 2000, the rapprochement 
between Ukraine and NATO faced an external obstacle, the Russians, which produced a 
partial drift of Ukrainian foreign policy priorities back to the East.  
                                                 
40 “The History of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Participation in Peacekeeping Operations,” available 
from http://www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?lang=en&part=peacekeeping&sub=history, accessed 22 November 
2006. 
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This Eastward drift of Ukrainian foreign policy was conditioned by the 
emergence of new motivations to preserve good relations with Russia for the sake of 
Ukraine's further economic development. This fact, along with Ukrainian energy 
dependence, meant that Russia remained Ukraine's major trading partner and market as of 
2001.41 The authorities' failure to diversify Ukraine's energy sources and markets and to 
reduce its economic dependence on Russia after 1991 made it necessary to appease 
Russia, which under Putin's leadership strongly opposed Ukrainian rapprochement with 
NATO.  
As a consequence, NATO-Ukraine relations slowed considerably and in 2000 
began to deteriorate due to a series of scandals involving former Ukrainian President 
Leonid Kuchma. The first signs of international scandal emerged with suspicions that 
Kuchma had personally authorized the sale of a Kulchuga radar system, which can track 
all existing aircraft without detection, to Iraq in July 2000, only two months after U.S. 
President Bill Clinton visited Kyiv to cement the U.S.-Ukrainian strategic partnership.42 
The scandal, dubbed “Kolchuga-gate,” broke out when a former Ukrainian Presidential 
Guard officer, Major Melnichenko, made public audio tapes of Kuchma authorizing other 
state officials to sell Kulchugas to Iraq. Although the deal was never proven, Kuchma’s 
reluctance to clarify the situation and his confrontational behavior considerably 
complicated Ukrainian relations with the West and especially the U.S. As former deputy 
Head of the Presidential Administration, Vasyl Baziv, noted, Ukraine categorically 
refused to accept such a tone in its relations with the West.43  
Another disturbing scandal erupted in September of the same year, with the 
disappearance of Georgiy Gongadze, a Ukrainian journalist famous for investigating  
 
                                                 
41 Hutchinson Country Facts: Ukraine, available 
from http://www.tiscali.co.uk/reference/encyclopaedia/countryfacts/ukraine.html, accessed 28 August 
2006. 
42 “Ukraine Turns Down Early Membership Prospect In NATO,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 1, 
Issue 43, 1 July 2004, available from 
http://www.jamestown.org/print_friendly.php?volume_id=401&issue_id=3005&article_id=2368187, 
accessed 15 November 2006.  
43 “Ukraine Turns Down Early Membership Prospect in NATO.” 
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government corruption. The same audio tapes made public by Melnichenko contained a 
conversation between Kuchma and former Minister of Interior General Kravchenko in 
which they discussed the necessity of doing something about Gongadze. 
Of course, the West could not tolerate the situation in Ukraine. It became clear 
that Ukraine under Kuchma and his semi-totalitarian regime was not a candidate to join 
the Western democratic regimes and NATO. Ukraine was very close to being considered 
a rogue state in Kuchma's second presidential term. His strategy of blaming the West for 
its unwillingness to consider Ukraine as a future ally led to so-called “Kuchma fatigue,” 
the refusal of NATO and the EU to consider Ukrainian integration while Kuchma was in 
office.44 For example, Kuchma was not invited to attend the 2002 Prague NATO summit 
meetings. It was decided that the NATO-Ukraine Commission, traditionally held during 
the summit, would be conducted by foreign ministers in order to avoid Kuchma’s 
presence. Although Kuchma made a unilateral decision to go to Prague anyway, he was 
not welcome and no official meetings were held with him. 
Ukrainian authorities declared their aspirations to join NATO in May 2002, 
knowing that NATO would not under any circumstances invite Ukraine to the 
Membership Action Plan during the Prague summit. This might be considered a tricky 
political move by Kuchma to maintain his legitimacy with the Ukrainian population by 
blaming the West for marginalizing Ukraine.  
Two weeks after Ukraine declared its intentions to join NATO, on a visit to Kyiv 
on July 9, 2002, NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson stated, “The task before us 
now is to concentrate on building upon and enhancing our Distinctive Partnership …A lot 
will depend on Ukraine's resolve to take reforms forward. But we are ready to go as far as 
Ukraine can.”45 The Ukrainian declaration of its NATO membership aspirations was not 
ignored by the Alliance. Both sides were waiting for the approaching NATO summit. 
Ukraine was expecting the reaction of NATO, and NATO, although not planning to 
                                                 
44 Taras Kuzio, “EU and Ukraine: A Turning Point in 2004?” Occasional Papers, No. 47, November 
2003, available from http://www.iss-eu.org/occasion/occ47.pdf, accessed 20 November 2006. 
45 “Celebrating Five Years of NATO-Ukraine Partnership,” 10 July 2002, available 
from http://152.152.96.1/docu/update/2002/07-july/e0709a.htm, accessed 26 November 2006. 
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invite Ukraine, had to change its strategy to develop relations with Ukraine based on new 
realities. As expected, everything fell into place at the NATO summit in Prague.  
F. FORGOTTEN ASPIRATIONS FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP AND THE 
IMPLICATIONS FOR UKRAINE'S IMAGE (2002-2004)  
After the summit in Prague, NATO-Ukraine relations entered a new era. As 
predicted, Ukraine was not invited to the Membership Action Plan. At the same time, the 
Alliance reacted to the Ukrainian declaration by signing the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan 
(NUAC). The NUAC, although lacking a clear position on Ukrainian membership in 
NATO, is similar in content to the NATO Membership Action Plan. It contains principles 
and objectives which, if implemented by the state, prepare it to meet all the criteria of 
NATO membership. Thus NATO kept the door open for Ukraine, but not with Kuchma 
in the President's office.  
Launching the new format for cooperation and signing NUAC tested the 
seriousness of Ukrainian intentions. As the document states,  
the purpose of the Action Plan is to identify clearly Ukraine’s strategic 
objectives and priorities in pursuit of its aspirations towards full 
integration into Euro-Atlantic security structures and to provide a strategic 
framework for existing and future NATO-Ukraine cooperation under the 
Charter. 
After signing the Action Plan, Kyiv could no longer refer to external reasons for 
its failure to integrate into NATO and the family of Western democracies. Everything 
depended on Kyiv and its progress in implementing the provisions of the Plan. The 
provisions included strengthening democracy and the rule of law; respect for human 
rights; the principle of separation of powers and judicial independence; democratic 
elections in accordance with Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) norms; political pluralism; freedom of speech and press; respect for the rights for 
national and ethnic minorities, and non-discrimination on political, religious or ethnic 
grounds as well as adoption of all relevant legislation in pursuit of these objectives.46 As  
 
                                                 
46 NATO-Ukraine Action Plan, Prague, 22 November 2002, available 
from http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b021122a.htm, accessed 12 December 2006.  
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events demonstrate, Kyiv failed to implement its own ambitions. Kuchma's highly 
corrupt oligarchic power regime not only doomed democratic reform, but threatened also 
to turn Ukraine into a rogue state.  
Having damaged Ukraine's good relationship with the West, Kuchma turned his 
attention back to Russia. Official Kyiv's new foreign policy motivations and its drift to 
the East were accompanied by changes in the state’s international behavior. Instead of 
adapting internal economic legislation to Euro-Atlantic norms and practice, thereby 
implementing its commitments under NUAP, the government became active in creating 
the Common Economic Space (CES) with Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia.47 However, 
Kuchma’s new policy did not bring the anticipated positive results. Moreover, in 
November 2003, Russia and Ukraine faced the most serious crisis in their history. The 
island of Tuzla in the Black Sea became a bone of contention in Ukraine-Russia relations 
after Moscow expressed doubts about Ukraine's claim to the island. In the terms of multi-
vector (East and West) foreign policy, official Kyiv failed to improve its relations with 
West and did not achieve much in its relations with the East.  
Overall, Ukrainian foreign policy motivations in 2000-2004 were characterized by 
lack of clarity. Ukraine's international behavior under Kuchma’s multi-vector foreign 
policy was characterized by a return to the practice of balancing between the West and 
the East. Seeking protection under the Western “umbrella” and support in its problematic 
relations with Russia, and at the same time seeking room under the Russian “umbrella” in 
case of confrontation with the West, Ukraine’s government found itself in a situation 
similar to 1991, aggravated by international political isolation. Its unclear foreign policy 
motivations and unpredictable international behavior contributed to the reversion of 
Ukraine's image to that of a near-degenerate state. Consequently, Ukraine lost a unique 
opportunity for gradual integration into NATO proposed in the NATO-Ukraine Action 
Plan. It was clear that NATO would not consider Ukrainian membership until the end of 
Kuchma’s presidency and Kyiv's unclear policy of balancing between West and East.  
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G. IMPACT OF THE 2004 ORANGE REVOLUTION ON UKRAINE'S 
IMAGE AND THE REVIVAL OF UKRAINIAN ASPIRATIONS FOR 
NATO MEMBERSHIP  
Karl Deutsch and Richard Merritt present an argument about the significance of 
events for the change of international image. They identify three types of events which 
can contribute to image change: spectacular events, cumulative events and shifts in the 
policy of governments or mass media.48 Spectacular events and their significance for a 
state's international image change are of special interest for this thesis. Ukraine's Orange 
Revolution, which ended the Kuchma regime and revitalized interest in Ukrainian 
integration into NATO and Western democratic society, can be seen as a spectacular 
event. Scholars disagree about the significance of image changes produced by spectacular 
events. However, the Ukrainian example proves that spectacular events can have a 
considerable impact on a state's image. The Orange Revolution and its aftermath 
considerably altered NATO's view of Ukraine and changed NATO-Ukraine relations.  
The Orange Revolution was sparked by the Kuchma regime's electoral fraud 
during the presidential elections. One of the main slogans of the revolution was “Ukraine 
without Kuchma!” Kuchma's failures in the international arena were accompanied by 
lamentable social conditions and poor quality of life for average Ukrainians. After 
democratically elected Yushchenko became President, the hopes for Ukrainian 
membership in NATO moved closer to reality. On April 20, 2005, NATO Secretary 
General Jaap De Hoop Scheffer stated in an interview with the Financial Times that 
“membership standards can be much more easily fulfilled by the Yushchenko 
government than by the former Kuchma government.”49 The change in NATO’s attitude 
toward Ukraine can be explained by the change of the state’s image in the eyes of the 
Alliance.  
Yushchenko's arrival in the Presidential office in 2005 also marked an end to 
Kuchma’s multi-vector foreign policy, which put Ukraine into limbo with no clear or 
                                                 
48 Karl Deutsch and Richard Merritt, “Effects of Events on National and International Images,” 
International Behavior (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), edited by Herbert C. Kelman, 135-
184. 
49 Taras Kuzio, “Ukraine moves closer to NATO Membership,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 2, issue 
84, April 2005. 
 25
concrete foreign policy priorities or strategy. From the very first days of his Presidency, 
Yushchenko repeatedly declared that the only option for Ukraine’s development was full 
economic and political integration into the EU and NATO. On his visits to Western 
states, he requested support for Ukrainian endeavors. Clear foreign policy motivations, 
dedication to a Euro-Atlantic course for Ukraine’s development as an independent state, 
and domestic reforms to fight corruption changed Ukraine's image.  
According to Hermann and Fischerkeller, an ally is an actor who is “ready to 
pursue mutually beneficial economic relations and cooperate in peaceful joint efforts to 
protect and improve the global environment; [an ally is] motivated by altruism as much 
as by self-interest.”50 Taking this into consideration, Ukraine was never so close to being 
seen as an ally as in 2005. After 15 years of half-measures and false starts, Ukraine 
embarked on a path of comprehensive reforms and Euro-Atlantic integration.  
At a meeting in Vilnius on April 21, 2005, NATO invited Ukraine to begin 
Intensified Dialogue on Ukraine’s prospects for NATO membership. According to 
NATO’s official website,  
the formula of Intensified Dialogue has its roots in the 1997 Madrid 
summit, at which NATO Heads of State and Government decided to 
continue the Alliance’s intensified dialogues with those nations that aspire 
to NATO membership or that otherwise with to pursue a dialogue with 
NATO on membership questions and relevant reforms.51  
Previous rounds of NATO enlargement showed that Intensified Dialogue is 
followed by an invitation to implement the NATO Membership Action Plan. The fact that 
Ukraine was invited to enter into Intensified Dialogue with NATO only four months after 
the Orange Revolution proves that changes in Ukraine were recognized by NATO, and 
that NATO is ready to perceive Ukraine as a probable member—in other words, an ally. 
The Orange Revolution and the victory of democracy in Ukraine are strong 
empirical support for Herman and Fischekeller’s argument for the significance of events 
for international image change. NATO's invitation to begin Intensified Dialogue only 
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four months after the Ukrainian revolution shows how change of image influences the 
outcome of foreign policy toward the image holder. From a practical point of view, the 
Ukrainian goal to integrate into NATO had clear chances for success due to the Alliance 
Open Door policy. As NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer told reporters in 
April 2005, NATO and its member states stood ready to do what they could to help 
Ukraine achieve its goals.52  
H. EFFECT OF INTERNAL POLITICAL INSTABILITY ON UKRAINE'S 
IMAGE  
What took place in Ukraine after the Orange Revolution presents many lessons. 
The Orange Revolution is part of the popular wave of democratization in Eastern Europe. 
Political instability in Ukraine following the revolution resulted from the power struggle 
between the political groups that had propagated the ideas of the Revolution and 
democratic transformation. The “Orange coalition,” which came to power after the 
revolution but has since collapsed, consisted of four main political groupings: “Our 
Ukraine” Party (backed by Yushchenko), Block of Yulia Tymoshenko (headed by Yulia 
Tymoshenko), Socialist Party (headed by Oleksandr Moroz) and Party of Industrialists 
and Entrepreneurs of Ukraine (headed by Anatolii Kinakh). Right after the presidential 
elections, Yushchenko formed the Orange coalition government, appointing 
representatives of the four political groups. However, all four immediately expressed 
discontent with the proportional importance of their ministerial mandates; their 
disagreements rapidly turned into open political confrontation. The President's efforts to 
mediate and reunite the coalition government were unsuccessful. The new Ukrainian 
government failed the survivability and professionalism tests due to the confrontational 
climate. As a consequence, the government was fired by Yushchenko after only seven 
months.  
Such political instability could not be ignored by NATO. Although the new 
Ukrainian government insured a steady flow of reform focused on integration into 
NATO, the Alliance leadership was concerned with the political instability. As a 
confirmation that Ukraine's image was damaged, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop 
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Scheffer stated after his meeting with newly appointed Prime Minister of Ukraine Yurii 
Ekhanurov in October 2005 that Ukrainian integration into NATO should be a 
performance based process and not only an events-based process.53 
Unfortunately, the great Orange hope became a great Orange disappointment due 
to immature behavior by the political elite, who missed a chance to further democratic 
development and whose legitimacy among the Ukrainian people was greatly undermined. 
As a consequence, parliamentary elections in March 2006 were won by the opposition 
Party of the Regions of Ukraine headed by Yushchenko’s main opponent Victor 
Yanukovych. Before Yanukovych's appointment as Prime Minister on August 4, 2006, 
his party openly opposed Ukraine's move to join NATO, describing the process as an 
inexplicable rush.  
However, after Yanukovych became Prime Minister, NATO-Ukraine relations did 
not suffer complications. Moreover, the newly elected parliamentary deputies, with 
majority support for Yanukovych, nonetheless ratified the Memorandum of 
Understanding allowing NATO access to Ukrainian airlift capacity. The ratification of 
this Memorandum had been on hold since 2004 and did not make it through the previous 
parliament. NATO's use of the unique and inexpensive Ukrainian airlift capacity benefits 
Ukraine, from a commercial point of view, and for NATO it is beneficial as well because 
strategic airlift is a considerable capabilities gap for the European Allies (compared, for 
example, with the capabilities of the U.S.). Yanukovych and his parliamentary supporters 
made a positive practical contribution to mutually beneficial cooperation with NATO. 
Although the Party of Regions of Ukraine had earlier opposed ratification of the 
Memorandum, it was nonetheless ratified once Yanukovych took office. The new 
Cabinet of Ministers and the Parliament showed an exemplary joint effort on this issue, 
and Yanukovych's team demonstrated the scope of their influence over Ukrainian foreign 
policy.  
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Ukrainian integration into NATO before the next parliamentary elections in 2011 
depends greatly on the position of Yanukovych and his supporters in Parliament. Visiting 
NATO headquarters on 14 September 2006, Yanukovych said there was  
no alternative today for the strategy that Ukraine has chosen in its relations 
with NATO… For Ukraine it is very important to participate in the 
creation of the new system of European security, and such an opportunity 
is given to us today with the Intensified Dialogue with NATO and 
cooperation with NATO.54  
Asked if Ukraine would join NATO’s Membership Action Plan, he responded 
that because of the Ukrainian political situation, “we will now have to take a pause, but 
the time will come when the decision will be made.”55 He did not indicate what kind of 
decision to expect. 
The answer can be inferred from the draft of the Declaration on National Unity of 
Ukraine and its provisions on NATO-Ukraine relations proposed by the Party of Regions 
of Ukraine. Creation of the Declaration was a Yushchenko initiative. The document had 
to incorporate key aspects of Ukraine's development, including its foreign policy, and had 
to be supported by different political parties. Signing the Declaration was intended to end 
growing political instability which endangered the integrity of the state. Yushchenko’s 
initial text of the provision on NATO-Ukraine relations stated that Ukraine will “join the 
NATO Membership Action Plan.”56 The Party of the Regions of Ukraine proposed 
modifying it to read, “Mutually beneficial cooperation with NATO, resolution of the 
question regarding NATO membership via a referendum” or, alternately, “Mutually 
beneficial cooperation with NATO in accordance with the current version of the Law on 
National Security of Ukraine. Question regarding NATO membership must be resolved 
via a referendum. Every necessary step should be taken by Ukraine in this regard.”57 The 
rhetoric of this text is open to different interpretations. The final version advocates  
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[m]utually beneficial cooperation with NATO in accordance with the 
“Law on National Security of Ukraine” (in accordance with the version of 
the law that is current on the day of the signing of this Universal). To 
resolve the question regarding NATO membership via a referendum, 
which is to take place after Ukraine completes every step necessary for 
it.”58  
The statement regarding joining the NATO Membership Action Plan was 
removed from the text. Considering that the majority of the Ukrainian population opposes 
NATO membership, and factoring in the low probability that Parliament would pass new 
laws on this matter, it is fair to say that Party of the Regions of Ukraine achieved its short 
term goal of delaying membership in MAP at least until 2011.  
Signing the Declaration cooled political tension in Ukraine but did not put an end 
to political instability. The President's statements of Ukrainian readiness to join MAP are 
not supported by the Prime Minister, who is backed by the Parliamentary majority and 
thus has considerable leverage in foreign policy.  
In a politically unstable situation, Ukraine's foreign policy motivations again have 
become unclear and its behavior in the international arena is unpredictable. 
Consequently, Ukraine's image has suffered, and it is not perceived, as it was in 2005, as 
a NATO ally. This explains why Ukraine was not invited to join the NATO Membership 
Action Plan during the Riga summit. Ukraine's chance to become a NATO member is 
delayed at least until the next parliamentary elections in 2011.  
I.  CONCLUSION  
Since the beginning of NATO-Ukraine relations in 1991, cooperation has been 
influenced by the Alliance's image of Ukraine. Changes in foreign policy motivations and 
international behavior, which are the main components of image formation, influenced 
the evolution of NATO-Ukraine relations starting with the NACC and later the PfP 
programs, the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan and 
the invitation to join in Intensified Dialogue with NATO. The fact that Ukraine was not 
invited to the MAP during the Riga summit is explained by Ukraine's current image,  
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which is marred by unclear foreign policy motivations and unpredictable international 
behavior. If not improved, this negative image will block the state’s integration into 
NATO even if all official criteria for NATO membership are met.  
 31
IV.  EFFECT OF NATO MEMBERS’ FOREIGN POLICY ON 
UKRAINE: NATO AND EU INTERDEPENDENCE  
A.  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes how particular NATO members’ foreign policy towards 
Ukraine affects Ukraine's integration into the Alliance. NATO is an organization 
comprising 26 allies. Consequently, the image of Ukraine held by NATO as an 
organization and the Alliance’s policy toward Ukraine results from commonly accepted 
policy, elaboration of which is based on consensus. Without minimizing the importance 
of any NATO member, for all practical purposes, the foreign policy of several specific 
NATO members determine NATO's general policy. The important states include the 
U.S., Germany, France and Poland.  
The current complex situation results from differences among these states on the 
future of NATO and Ukraine’s status. These differences can be explained by divergence 
in national interests and motivations. The U.S. and Poland, with a rationale for seeing 
Ukraine as an ally rather than a partner, are the most active advocates for Ukraine’s 
membership in NATO. The reluctance of France and Germany to perceive Ukraine as an 
ally and to support Ukraine in its endeavors is also dictated by rationale, one rooted in 
their respective national political and economic interests. Continued U.S. and Polish 
support will be crucially important for Ukraine’s full integration into the European and 
Euro-Atlantic institutions. At the same time, membership will remain blocked if France 
and Germany do not change their positions.  
B. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD UKRAINE  
American policy toward Ukraine has always been crucially important to NATO’s 
cooperation with the country. The chances of Ukraine joining the Alliance depend greatly 
on the position of official Washington. The history of U.S.-Ukraine relations 
demonstrates variations in American interests and strategy. America's initial strategy in 
establishing relations with Ukraine was characterized by active participation to support 
Ukrainian development as a stable and democratic European state. Considerable financial 
assistance to Kyiv during that period can be considered investments, primarily in U.S. 
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strategic security on the European continent. The history of U.S.-Ukraine relations and 
the changing U.S. strategy reveal that the U.S. took a lead in shaping NATO’s approach 
to Kyiv, and specifically in securing Ukraine's status as a NATO Distinctive Partner in 
1997 and inviting Ukraine to join Intensified Dialogue in 2005.  
Changes in U.S. foreign policy can be explained by the politico-psychological 
realm of international relations theory. Additionally, considerable changes in U.S. 
strategy after the Orange Revolution provide strong empirical support for the significance 
of events for image change and the outcome of foreign policy.59 Recognition of 
democratic changes in Ukraine by the U.S. (in contrast to key Western European NATO 
members) and changes in Ukraine’s image had clear justification. America's interest in 
cooperating with Ukraine was always conscious, with clear goals. At the same time, the 
importance of Ukraine’s image change for the evolution of U.S. foreign policy strategy is 
obvious. 
1. U.S. Policy toward Ukraine, 1991-2004 
Immediately following its emergence as an independent nation in 1991, Ukraine 
fell into the orbit of U.S. strategic interests. As Celeste Wallander puts it,  
Ukraine is a key European country with geopolitical importance in 
Europe, the Black Sea region, and the Caucasus. Its location makes it a 
vital country in geoeconomic terms, as well as a potential trade corridor 
between Europe and Asia. Ukraine’s economy is more diversified than 
many in the post-communist region, with potential in the energy, defense, 
scientific-technological manufacturing, and agricultural sectors … 
Consolidating Ukraine’s future as a  democratic country is important to 
U.S. national interests and requires a strong  and sustained strategy.60  
Among the most obvious rationales for active U.S. engagement with young 
Ukraine was the need for reliable mechanisms for cooperation with a strategically located 
new state. Ukraine was a powder keg, having inherited almost 40 percent of the Soviet 
Union's military equipment. In terms of numbers, there were 1,944 strategic nuclear 
warheads and 2,500 tactical nuclear weapons, 220 strategic nuclear carriers, including 
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176 land based intercontinental ballistic missiles and 44 strategic bombers (Tu-160 and 
Tu-95). Conventional forces comprised 6,500 battle tanks, more than 7,000 armored 
combat vehicles, 1,500 combat aircraft, 270 attack helicopters, 350 combat ships and 
support vessels, millions of small arms and millions of tons of ammunition. Rapidly 
initiating mechanisms for cooperation and consultation created U.S. opportunities to 
further Ukraine’s “safe” development as a denuclearized and partly demilitarized state. 
Appropriate Ukrainian decisions in that direction were supported by large amounts of 
targeted American financial assistance. This explains why, from 1991 to 1996, Ukraine 
became the world's third largest recipient of U.S. assistance (after Israel and Egypt) and 
the number one recipient in former Soviet territory.61 
Did official Washington perceive Ukraine as a probable future member of NATO 
in the early 1990s? Definitely not. Ukrainian leadership and diplomats rejected the idea 
repeatedly, even opposing the first round of NATO enlargement.62 Further, the U.S. and 
other Western nations indicated that Ukraine was not a candidate for NATO 
membership.63 This demonstrates that at first Ukraine was not perceived as a probable 
ally but rather as a partner requiring assistance with stable and safe democratic 
development. The transition to democracy requires time and considerable reforms.64 
Accordingly, the initial strategy of the U.S. toward Ukraine was not focused on Ukraine’s 
integration into NATO.  
Later, on the eve of the first round of NATO enlargement, U.S. foreign policy and 
its vision of Ukraine’s place had not changed considerably. In 1998, American foreign 
policy and international relations analyst Robert J. Art claimed that 
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NATO can expand without alienating Russia and endangering Ukraine. 
The special deals cut with these two – the founding Act with Russia and 
the NATO-Ukraine Charter – will square the circle. Both states will be 
kept organically out of NATO but intimately tied to it. Moreover, NATO’s 
expansion must be limited and, preferably, stopped, if Russia’s 
cooperation is to be secured … that is exactly what the United States and 
its allies risk if they next induct the Baltic states or Ukraine into NATO.65  
This view reflected the left wing of the U.S. Democratic Party during NATO 
enlargement between the Madrid invitations of 1997 and the actual first round of 
enlargement in the spring of 1999.66  
At the same time, when Ukraine asked for U.S. support to strengthen NATO-
Ukraine relations and bring them to a qualitatively new level in 1996, the U.S. response 
was positive. Official Washington understood that institutionalization of NATO-Ukraine 
relations could help prevent Ukraine's reincorporation into a Russian-dominated security 
structure—a scenario that would cast the shadow of Russian power on the Polish border 
with major implications for Alliance defense planning.67 The U.S.-Ukrainian 
Commission, created in 1996, worked on these ideas from Kyiv; as a result, at the 1997 
Madrid summit Ukraine became a NATO Distinctive Partner. This status opened 
considerable opportunities for Ukraine to conduct an independent foreign policy and 
receive more benefits. 
Between 1997 and 2004, U.S. policy toward Ukraine was characterized by 
cautiousness. Official Washington perceived Ukraine during those years as dominated by 
President Kuchma and the oligarchic “clans” supporting him. The U.S. repeatedly 
expressed concern about Ukraine's fitful economic reforms, widespread corruption, and 
deteriorating human rights record.68 The first Ukrainian declaration of its NATO 
membership aspirations in 2002 was cautiously welcomed by the U.S. The odds of 
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America supporting Ukraine for NATO membership in 2002 were extremely low because 
of a series of quarrels between national leaders in 2000-2001. The Kulchuga-gate 
scandal, followed by an exchange of unpleasant “compliments” between Washington and 
Kyiv, are the most obvious. At the same time, while not backing Ukraine’s NATO 
aspirations, Washington continued to provide considerable economic assistance.  
Therefore, U.S. foreign policy during the so-called “post-communist syndrome” 
from 1991 to 2004 was based on the strategic interests of the U.S. and its European allies 
in making Ukraine safer and building the foundation for a stable democracy. 
Approaching U.S. foreign policy during that period from the perspective of political 
psychology, one can say that American foreign policy was based on the perception of 
Ukraine as a partner. Assistance was practically intended to keep Ukraine from becoming 
an unpredictable or even a rogue state. 
2. U.S. Policy after the 2004 Orange Revolution  
Significant changes in U.S. foreign policy and a switch in the American position 
on Ukraine’s bid for NATO membership after the Orange Revolution are strong 
empirical support for how events affect both images and foreign policy.69 Why did the 
U.S. recognize and actively support democratic transformations in Ukraine? There is no 
doubt that a helping hand from the U.S. demonstrated yet again America's devotion to 
liberal democratic values. Even America's negative experience with Ukraine under 
Kuchma did not slow efforts to consolidate democracy and improve relations with Kyiv.  
Starting in 2004, U.S. interest in Ukraine grew rapidly, accompanied by 
qualitatively new strategic goals reflected in increasing American scholarly publications 
and Congressional Research Service reports. The new U.S. strategy advocated Ukraine’s 
integration into the family of Western democracies and NATO, and called on the EU to 
provide similar support and “open the door” to Ukraine.70 
American scholars said that Ukraine must become a priority for the United States. 
Wallander wrote,  
                                                 
69 Kelman, 135. 
70 “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution and U.S. Policy,” CRS Reports to Congress, 1 April 2005, 7.  
 36
Ukraine is a priority not only for … strategic reasons, but also because 
U.S. credibility is at stake: if the United States cannot sustain a serious 
strategy for Ukrainian development and integration, it is difficult to see 
how it can do so for countries with less economic potential, weaker 
democratic institutions, and  further removed from vital European 
allies.71  
Robert Wexler, a member of U.S. House of Representatives, said in 2005, “I hope 
the Administration will discuss the likelihood and timetable for Ukraine joining 
NATO.”72 Although U.S. support does not guarantee success, American endorsement is 
very important.  
The new U.S. strategy was still based on conscious interests and clear foreign 
policy objectives, with a clear rationale to see Ukraine as an ally rather than just a 
partner, and to advocate Ukrainian membership in NATO. The rationale can be explained 
by a rift between key Western European powers and the U.S., which began when the 
Soviet threat disappeared and became clearer in recent years.  
The second Iraqi campaign by a U.S.-led coalition led to open criticism of the 
American foreign policy by key European allies and EU trendsetters Germany and 
France. Given Germany and France's political and economic potential and importance in 
shaping EU policy, when they change their view of the traditionally strong American 
position, it has the potential to become reality.  
Europe remains the most important and indispensable U.S. partner in all 
significant global issues in the new century – the global environment, international 
development policy, high technology, etc. The EU has the population base, the economic 
and technological capabilities, and the cultural and political attributes of a global power. 
In Joseph Nye’s terms, Europe has the “soft power” that increasingly determines 
international influence in the postmodern world.73 Energizing American efforts toward 
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Central and Eastern Europe to strengthen the U.S. position on the continent is a logic step 
for Washington. The case of American-Polish relations is the best of several examples of 
U.S. success in this direction.  
America's position on the necessity of integrating Ukraine into NATO and the EU 
does not look like a request that the European powers shelter a “poor cousin” against 
drifting back to authoritarianism. Ukraine's strategic location and economic, political, 
scientific and military potential are strong arguments against key European powers 
reluctance to accept democratic changes in the country. Concretely, Ukraine's unique 
strategic airlift capabilities could resolve a major problem of European NATO members 
related to the capability gap between them and the U.S. Moreover, Ukrainian military 
potential and strategic airlift capabilities are far from superfluous for the EU's long term 
process of creating a common European military force. Therefore, by supporting 
Ukraine's membership in NATO and EU, the U.S. both supports Ukrainian strategic goals 
and simultaneously strengthens its own position with a probable NATO member. 
In light of Alliance difficulties reaching consensus on major decisions, Ukraine, if 
accepted in NATO, might become a close supporter of NATO's main protagonist, the 
U.S. In this context, it should be noted that U.S. concerns about intra-Alliance divisions, 
revealed after 2003, grew to the point that the Senate asked President George Bush to 
raise the issue of changing NATO's consensus rule. One possible approach to the 
evolution of decision making in NATO is to empower “coalitions within NATO.” This 
approach would mandate that the NATO Committee of Contributors, comprised of Allies 
prepared to contribute forces to operations, carry out operations on behalf of NATO.74 
Considering the U.S. support of Ukraine’s aspirations for NATO membership and the 
reluctance of the European Allies to extend the same support, Ukraine would logically 
become a member of a U.S.-led “coalition” within NATO. 
Of course, the scenario of coalitions within NATO is not all that likely. In its 
history, NATO has managed to withstand serious crises, and its “margin of safety” will 
allow it to weather the current situation. At any rate, Washington and Kyiv share mutual 
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interests in Ukrainian membership in NATO, which explains why the U.S. changed its 
image of Ukraine from a partner to an ally and changed its policy toward Ukraine and 
Ukrainian hopes for NATO and EU membership. 
3. U.S. Policy after the 2006 Parliamentary Elections 
Ukrainian Parliamentary elections in 2006 revealed internal political instability. 
Fruitless and debilitating disputes inside the Orange coalition, in power less than 15 
months, impeded progress in implementing a coherent reform program after the 
revolution. As a result, voters handed pro-Western parties a defeat, giving 32 percent of 
the vote to the Russia-backed Party of the Regions. This was a wake-up call for the U.S. 
David Kramer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, 
said in June 2006, “The positive atmosphere [towards Ukraine] at NATO ... has 
dissipated in the face of several factors.”75 Those factors include the vision of NATO-
Ukraine relations described by the head of the newly-formed government. Underlining 
the necessity of developing mutually beneficial cooperation between NATO and Ukraine, 
Yanukovych rejects the idea of near-term membership in NATO.76 Although 
Yanukovych bases his argument on negative public opinion on the issue, and NATO 
membership would probably fail to pass in a national referendum, his rhetoric is not the 
sort welcomed by the U.S. or NATO. The fact that NATO and member states' leaders 
always assign great importance to rhetoric also explains the reaction of Washington and 
the change in atmosphere towards Ukraine. Words, like actions, have consequences, and 
language becomes part of generally accepted political reality.77  
However, American foreign policy has not changed in ways which could affect 
the strategy and interests of U.S.-Ukraine relations. Importantly, official Washington 
responded positively to the formation of the Yanukovych government in August 2006. 
The new permanent government took Ukraine out of the limbo it had occupied since the 
                                                 
75 “NATO Gets Cold Feet on 2008 Enlargement,” Reuters, 3 July 2006, available from 
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L03599675.htm, accessed 28 August 2006. 
76 Presspoint with the Secretary General, Mr. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and the Prime Minister of 
Ukraine. 
77 Ian Q. R. Thomas, The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination (New York: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), 6.  
 39
March elections. A State Department spokesman said that the U.S. would work with the 
new government, given that it came to power in a democratic way. Nevertheless, 
American analysts believe that the U.S. will watch closely to see if the new Ukrainian 
government will try to reverse progress in democratization and other areas.78 Official 
Washington will keep an eye on developments within Ukraine, and what they see may 
change elements of U.S. foreign policy, although not U.S. strategy in general.  
Tracing the chronology of U.S.-Ukraine relations, one can see how America's 
strategy and interests changed over time. Changes in U.S. policy, influenced by the 
evolving Ukrainian image, greatly affected NATO's propose form of cooperation. Efforts 
by Washington allowed Ukraine to become NATO Distinctive Partner and join an 
Intensified Dialogue. As the main proponent of Ukrainian membership in NATO, the 
U.S. will continue to play a crucial role. At the same time, the invitation for Ukraine to 
join the NATO MAP will depend primarily on Ukraine’s persistent pursuit of necessary 
reforms along with the position of European allies, especially Germany and France. 
Without appropriate support by key European powers, Ukrainian membership in NATO 
will not become a reality.  
C.  NATO-EU INTERDEPENDENCE AND EUROPEAN AMBIVALENCE 
TOWARD UKRAINE  
European reaction to Ukraine's aspirations provides further evidence of NATO-
EU interdependence. The ambivalence of EU and its key powers regarding exactly what 
type of relationship it wants with Ukraine is a serious obstacle to Ukrainian membership 
in NATO. Western European reluctance to recognize transformations in Ukraine, to 
change their view of the state and to support Ukraine for NATO and EU membership 
have a clear justification. The causes of ambivalence (almost antagonism) are both 
political and economic. The political background is the continuous policy of key 
European powers to maximize their influence and political weight in Europe and the 
world. The economic background, indissolubly tied to energy security, is the close 
economic connection of France and Germany with Russia. Reluctance to support 
Ukraine’s rapprochement with NATO to the detriment of relations with Russia is the key 
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European allies' main economic reason. However, keeping the door to NATO closed 
against Ukraine, even for the long term, means the European allies indirectly create 
favorable conditions for the Kremlin to regain influence over Ukraine. As a result, 
reluctance to recognize democratic transformations in Ukraine and to perceive it as an 
ally, which is based primarily on national interests, partly nullifies U.S. and Polish 
support for Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic endeavors. The situation is a serious obstacle to 
Ukrainian integration into the family of Western democracies.  
1. France's Position  
France has never directly expressed either support or opposition to Ukrainian 
membership in NATO. At the same time, the French position on the future of NATO as a 
practical matter blocks Ukrainian membership. U.S. proposals for further enlargement of 
the Alliance and creation of new mechanisms for cooperation with Australia and Asian 
countries were blocked by Paris on the eve of NATO’s Riga summit in 2006. By 
opposing further Alliance transformation in general, France makes Ukrainian 
membership in NATO improbable.  
At the same time, one can see France's rationale for not perceiving Ukraine as an 
ally within NATO and EU. Official Paris understands that in regards to Ukrainian 
membership, the U.S., as the main proponent of NATO enlargement, will strengthen its 
standing in Europe. In 1996, President Chirac said, “My ambition is for the [European] 
Union to assert itself as an active and powerful pole, on an equal footing with the United 
States of America, in the world of the twenty first century, which … will be a multipolar 
one.”79  
Competition with the United States for a leading international role is rooted in the 
idea of France’s grandeur, of a strong and powerful France which “must lead a global 
policy in the centre of the World,” in De Gaulle's words.80 The development of European  
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Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within the EU, where France has strong political 
and economic standing, serves French national interests in achieving “equal footing” with 
the U.S. as an influence in Europe.  
French Defense Minister Michele Alliot-Marie explains French objections to the 
U.S. proposals on the eve of the Riga summit, stating that  
the development of “global partnership” would risk diluting the natural 
solidarity between Europeans and North Americans … and above all, send 
a bad political message: that of a campaign, at the initiative of the West, 
against those who do not share its conceptions.81  
Therefore, France's reluctance to support Ukrainian membership in NATO is part 
of its general obstruction of any NATO transformation which might threaten the 
international standing and influence of the EU in general and of France in particular.  
Another reason France does not support Ukraine's aspirations is its unwillingness 
to damage its developing relations with the Russian Federation. A Polish-Lithuanian 
proposal to change EU-Ukraine cooperation (from the European Union Politics of 
Neighborhood policy to another, with long-term prospects for EU membership) was 
cautiously supported by Germany but rejected by France. One of the French arguments 
was the uncertainty of official Paris on how Russia would react.82 France assigns special 
importance to its relations with Russia based on national interests, especially economic 
and energy interests.  
Recognizing France’s political weight in the EU and its ability to influence 
NATO internal processes, Russia created considerable economic incentives to enlist 
France's political support in the sphere of international relations. These economic 
incentives revolve around the stability of Russian energy resource supplies to Europe and 
France in particular. Specifically, two French companies, “Total” and “Elf”, have 
traditionally been among the largest buyers of Russian crude oil and oil products. “Total” 
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was one of the first to invest in the newly opened Russian oil industry, opening the 
possibility for France to participate in developing the giant Russian oil fields. One of the 
best examples of French involvement in the Russian oil industry is the fact that “Total” 
owns half of the shares in the huge, rich Kharyaga field in Nenets territory in the Timan 
Pechora basin.83 Recent rumors of the withdrawal of the company’s license for the 
Kharyaga project even caused the French Foreign Ministry to intervene. Foreign Minister 
Philip Douste-Blazy said in September 2006, “I really hope that the good relations 
between France and Russia translate very quickly into the possibility for “Total” to 
continue its whole program in Russia.”84 Putin’s statement that the rumors were 
exaggerated calmed the situation. 
In addition to the existing cooperation, France plans to participate in developing 
another giant untapped gas field in Russia known as Shtokman field. With 300 million 
cubic meters of gas located in the Barents Sea, it has the potential to become Russia’s 
major gas source for both internal and export markets. France's “Total” is one of four 
international companies involved in development of this challenging gas field, with 
production expected to begin in 2010.85 Considering that all of Europe depends on 
Russian natural gas (50 percent of imports) and oil (30 percent of imports), French efforts 
to strengthen economic ties with Russia will not meet strong objections from most EU 
members.86  
To summarize, France's ambivalence about relations with Ukraine and Ukraine’s 
future status in NATO and EU can be explained by national political and economic 
interests. While it wants equal footing with the U.S. in world affairs, France is satisfied 
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with NATO’s current composition, tasks, roles and missions, and resists NATO 
transformations that might negatively affect French international standing. Ukrainian 
membership in NATO is perceived by France as strengthening the U.S. position in 
Europe. Reluctance to damage relations with Russia is another explanation for France's 
negative attitude towards further NATO enlargement and Ukrainian membership. These 
strong reasons and French opposition make Ukrainian prospects for membership in 
NATO practically unlikely.  
2. Germany's Position  
The position of Germany on Ukrainian membership in NATO is no less important 
than the position of France. Unlike France, Germany participates in NATO’s military 
wing and thus is better integrated in NATO institutionally. Moreover, Germany’s active 
support for the first round of NATO enlargement greatly determined the successful 
integration of Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland into the Alliance. In regards to the 
German position on Ukrainian NATO membership, official Berlin welcomed democratic 
transformations in Ukraine and Euro-Atlantic orientation of its foreign policy. At the 
same time, in contrast to official Washington, the German leadership did not openly 
express a positive or negative view of Ukrainian membership in NATO. Nevertheless, 
several factors indicate that Germany does not have adequate reason to perceive Ukraine 
as a probable ally within NATO. Moreover, keeping the doors of both NATO and EU 
closed would better serve German national interests and is more rational for Germany 
than support for Ukraine.  
The history of NATO expansion after the Cold War revived German interest in 
the scope of the Alliance’s enlargement. A position paper drafted by a German inter-
ministerial working group in 1994 named the Visegrad countries (Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovak Republic) as preferred candidates for parallel enlargements 
of NATO and EU and rejected collective admission of other aspiring countries.87 
Germany took great interest in expanding NATO and EU to protect itself from potential 
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instability in Central and Eastern Europe. As former German Defense Minister Volker 
Ruehe stated during Bundestag debates on NATO enlargement in 1994, 
The opening of the Alliance to the East is in our vital interests. One does 
not have to be a strategic genius to understand this … A situation where 
we are at the border of stability and security – stable here but unstable east 
to us, prosperity on this side but poverty on the other side of the border – 
such a situation is not tenable in the long run. It is for this reason that 
Germany’s eastern border can not be the border of NATO and the 
European Union. Either we will export stability or we will end up 
improving instability.88  
Ukraine, not a part of the Visegrad group and not a German neighbor 
geographically, is one of the other aspirants whose membership in NATO does not 
especially serve German national interests. It is obvious that the reason for actively 
advocating Czech, Hungarian and especially Polish membership in NATO cannot be 
applied to Ukraine. Moreover, Berlin understands that Ukrainian integration into NATO 
will require considerable political and economic assistance for NATO membership-
oriented reforms. For the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovak Republic, such 
assistance is justified by German national interest, especially in the security sphere, but 
the same cannot be said of Ukraine. For these reasons, Germany is ready to perceive 
Ukraine as a partner with democratic transformations and a West-oriented foreign policy 
but not as a probable ally. Assistance to Ukraine is not seen as a justified burden. 
Another clear rationale for not accepting Ukraine as an ally within NATO and EU 
comes from Germany’s unwillingness to support Ukrainian endeavors that might harm 
relations with Russia. Like France, Germany has recently been active in developing 
relations with Russia to serve national interests in the economic and energy spheres. 
Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, who signed the initial agreement with 
Putin to construct the North European Gas Pipeline (NEGP), is now chairman of the 
NEGP consortium. German companies “BASF” and “E.ON” together own 49 percent of  
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the consortium shares.89 It is intended that the pipeline cross the Baltic Sea to directly 
connect Russia with Germany. The project faces strong opposition from six European 
Union member states (Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovak Republic) 
and is considered an economic threat to Belarus and Ukraine. If the project is 
implemented, Belarus, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic and Ukraine will lose their 
status as transit states and the accompanying financial benefits.  
For Germany, NEGP is advantageous because it would make Germany the 
primary distributor of Russian gas in Europe. The pipeline will transport gas primarily to 
Germany with further distribution to the rest of Western Europe, as well as to the former 
transit countries. For Ukraine, which now sees 80 percent of Russian gas pass through its 
territory en route to the EU, the consequences of this project are predictable: Ukraine will 
lose considerable financial benefits and its strong political leverage with Russia. Given 
the considerable financial and political benefits for Germany from the NEGP project, its 
implementation essentially makes Germany and Ukraine serious competitors in the 
energy sphere. If Ukraine joins NATO and the EU in particular, Germany risks gaining 
another “dissenter” like Poland, which in 2006 vetoed the start of talks on a new 
economic and energy partnership between EU and Russia.90  
Germany’s reluctance to support Ukrainian integration into NATO and EU has a 
clear rationale. Germany does not want to threaten its relations with Russia by supporting 
Ukraine’s membership in NATO. In addition, considerable political support and 
economic assistance to Ukraine would not be as well-justified by national foreign policy 
motivations as were such expenditures in the first round of NATO enlargement. 
Supporting Ukrainian integration into the EU, Germany also risks gaining an economic  
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competitor and a dissenter. As a result, although Germany welcomes Ukraine's 
democratic reforms and pro-Western foreign policy, keeping the doors of both NATO 
and EU closed better serves German national interests.  
3. The Importance of Polish Support  
Like the U.S., Poland is an active advocate for Ukraine in NATO and EU. The 
fact that Poland is a reliable American ally and supports Washington's foreign policy is 
not the only explanation for Warsaw's position. Poland’s interest in Ukrainian 
membership in both NATO and EU is similar to the interest of Germany in Polish 
membership in these institutions in the 1990s. It is obvious that Poland would prefer as an 
eastern neighbor an ally fully integrated into Europe and Euro-Atlantic institutions over 
expansion of Russian influence on its border. This explains Poland’s changing perception 
of Ukraine from a partner to an ally and Poland's immediate advocacy for Ukraine’s entry 
into NATO. Considering the growing role of Poland in NATO and EU, Ukraine should 
take advantage of Poland's support. 
In 2002, when Ukrainian authorities announced their desire to join NATO, 
Warsaw officials immediately expressed approval. Polish President Aleksander 
Kwasniewski stated that “Poland will continue to be active in supporting the Euro-
Atlantic aspirations of Ukraine.”91 Polish support is important for Ukraine because 
Poland belongs to NATO and the EU, where it managed to rapidly consolidate its 
position after acquiring member status in 2004.  
Poland's growing importance as a regional actor is one of the most striking 
developments since the late 1990s. According to analysts, Poland has the best 
performance among new NATO members.92 Historically, Poland was an influential state 
in Central Europe. To play a leading role in the region today, as well as within the 
Alliance over the long run, Poland has consciously sought a strategic partnership with the 
United States. With U.S. political and economic support, Poland has gradually moved to 
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achieve its strategic goal and is the strongest U.S. ally in Central Europe today. Even 
while it was acquiring the EU member status, Poland, unlike EU trendsetters Germany 
and France, supported the U.S.-led second campaign in Iraq and contributed a significant 
military contingent to the coalition force. Also unlike most European countries, Poland 
supported Bush’s plans for missile defense and is willing to provide a radar site for a 
theater missile defense system.93 The current status of U.S.-Poland relations guarantees 
American support for Poland’s increasing self-confidence and status in Europe. At the 
same time, the availability of a strong European ally and EU member helps Washington 
preserve its strong political standing in Europe. 
In February 2006, Poland’s newly elected President Lech Kaczynski expressed 
his support for Ukraine’s membership in NATO, saying his country hopes to see Ukraine 
join NATO in 2008. At the same time, he urged Russia to drop its ideas of a “zone of 
influence.”94 It is notable that Kaczynski's statement came a month after a conflict 
between Moscow and Kyiv that began when Russia stopped natural gas supplies in mid-
winter until Ukraine agreed to pay twice the price. Like other European states, Poland 
reacted immediately. France, Germany and Italy encouraged Kyiv and Moscow to find a 
solution quickly, but Poland raised the alarm, alleging that Moscow was using its energy 
resources as a political weapon to influence “intractable” Ukraine. Poland was among the 
first to point to the Russian threat to EU energy security. A recent rift in Belarus-Russia 
relations, caused by a repeat of the Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict the year before, 
demonstrates that Polish alarm is well founded. Poland, which irritated key European 
powers France and Germany with its veto of EU-Russia economic and energy talks, has a 
strong argument for maintaining its position.  
In addition, an overwhelming majority of Polish people would like to see Ukraine 
as a NATO and EU ally. According to polls conducted by the Public Research 
Laboratory of Poland in January 2007, 76 percent of respondents support Ukraine’s  
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accession to NATO and EU.95 Such positive results can be explained by the fact that 
Soviet domination is still fresh in the minds of Polish people. Poland's leadership has 
social support for advocating Ukraine’s membership in NATO, which indicates that 
Poland will continue to support Ukraine.  
Polish support for Ukraine is based on a clear rationale. In addition to supporting 
U.S. foreign policy on the future of NATO, Poland wants to see Ukraine as a future 
member of NATO and EU based on its own national interests. Therefore, it is likely that 
Poland’s support will continue to be strong. Ukraine, in aiming for NATO membership, 
should take advantage of this support and study the domestic reforms that helped Poland 
gain its own membership in NATO.  
D.  CONCLUSION 
NATO members' images of Ukraine, as well as their position on the potential for 
Ukrainian membership, influence NATO’s common policy towards Ukraine. The 
positions of the U.S., France, Germany, and Poland essentially determine the future of 
Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic endeavors. The U.S. and Poland actively support Ukraine’s 
acceptance into NATO because it suits their national interests and vision of the Alliance's 
future. The same can be said of the ambivalence of France and Germany. U.S. and Polish 
support will continue to be crucial for Ukraine’s future status in NATO and EU, but 
Ukraine will remain blocked if the positions of France and Germany do not change. 
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V.  UKRAINIAN PUBLIC OPINION: THE MAJOR OBSTACLE 
TO NATO MEMBERSHIP 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on Ukrainian society's distorted and negative image of 
NATO. Even unanimity among NATO members to accept Ukraine into the Alliance will 
not guarantee success. Given negative Ukrainian public opinion, a national referendum 
on joining NATO, which is a prerequisite for membership, would probably fail. Negative 
public opinion undermines the sincerity of Ukraine’s leaders when they assert the 
country's dedication to joining NATO. 
Stereotypes and fears about NATO explain the negative perception of the 
Alliance by Ukrainian society. Anti-NATO propaganda, spread within the population for 
political purposes, keeps old stereotypes and fears active and creates groundless new 
myths that heavily influence public opinion and can keep the average Ukrainian from 
making a rational choice on the referendum on Ukraine’s bid to join NATO.  
Notably, almost half of Ukrainians consider themselves poorly informed about 
NATO. A clear failure by state authorities is responsible for the public's poor 
understanding of NATO, its post-Cold War transformation, current tasks, roles and 
missions, as well as the reasons NATO membership is the main priority of Ukrainian 
foreign policy. Without a well organized and smoothly conducted information campaign, 
Ukraine's main foreign policy task faces failure.96 
B.  POLL RESULTS 
Between 2002, when Ukraine first declared a desire to join NATO and 2006, 
when the question of Ukrainian membership was actively discussed within NATO, public 
opinion polls show that support for NATO membership has decreased while opposition 
has increased.  
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Attitude toward Ukraine's Membership 
in NATO 
Percentage of population 
Positive attitude  27 
Negative attitude  38.8 
Would not vote in the referendum 13.4 
Difficult to say 20.2 
No response 0.6 
Source: Oleksander Razumkov Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political 
Studies  
Table 2.   Public Opinion on Ukraine’s Integration into NATO (2002)97 
 
As Table 2 shows, in 2002, a third of the population (34.2 percent) had no clear 
opinion on whether to support the state’s bid for NATO membership. Ukrainian experts 
believed that most of the undecided would support NATO membership if an appropriate 
information campaign were conducted. To that end, they composed, coordinated and 
received state approval for a “State Program on Informing the Population about Ukraine’s 
Euro-Atlantic Integration” between 2004 and 2007. The program contained clear goals, 
mechanisms for implementation, and expected results.  
However, the program did not function as expected. More recent polls 
demonstrate that it failed to increase the number of pro-NATO voters as expected. In fact, 
a renewed anti-NATO propaganda campaign resulted in a decrease in support for the 
policy.  
Attitude toward Ukraine's Membership in 
NATO 
Percentage of population 
Positive attitude  23.5  
Negative attitude  65.1  
Difficult to say or no response 11.4  
Source: National Academy of Science of Ukraine 
Table 3.   Public Opinion on Ukraine’s Integration into NATO (2006)98 
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Despite prevailing negative public opinion, the majority of Ukrainian experts 
support NATO membership.99 Practically, this means that Ukraine’s entry into NATO is 
supported by those who are best informed about NATO. So, what about the population? 
According to the polls conducted in November 2006 by the Oleksander Razumkov 
Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies, 43.1 percent of the population 
consider themselves poorly informed about NATO; only three percent of respondents say 
they have a high level of awareness of NATO.100 Vladislav Yasniuk, director of the 
Foreign Ministry's NATO-Ukraine Relations Department, reports that polls conducted by 
his ministry in October 2006 show 24 percent of Ukrainians completely unaware of what 
NATO is.  
The urgent necessity for an effective information campaign is obvious. The 
campaign should not only explain why joining NATO is the main priority of Ukrainian 
foreign policy; it should also destroy old stereotypes and fears about NATO nurtured by 
anti-NATO propaganda with no rational foundation. 
C.  MAJOR STEREOTYPES INFLUENCING PUBLIC OPINION 
Anti-NATO propaganda campaigns conducted for political purposes nurture old 
stereotypes and fears from the Cold War years and create new ones which also affect 
public opinion. There are three major stereotypes that influence public opinion on NATO 
membership. In these stereotypes, NATO is seen as an enemy, NATO is seen as a block 
seeking Ukrainian territory, and NATO membership is seen as a heavy burden on the 
Ukrainian budget. 
1. NATO Perceived as an Enemy  
The stereotype about the hostile face of NATO is probably the most important 
and persistent. It is rooted in the Cold War and propaganda against NATO operations in 
Yugoslavia which emphasized the bombardment of fellow Slav Serbians and the 
expulsion of Orthodox people from their homes. Ignorance of the history of the conflict 
plays a major role here. The facts that Serbian armed forces started military operations 
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and that the NATO operation was a response to atrocities against the Albanian Muslim 
population were surely not included in such propaganda. The same can be said about the 
odds that the situation in Serbia will become a large scale uncontrolled regional conflict 
with ethnic and religious overtones. 
Poor awareness of NATO keeps the average Ukrainian from recognizing that 
former Yugoslav republics are current or aspiring NATO members. Better information on 
NATO's transformation and enlargement could help Ukrainian society to understand that 
these former Yugoslav republics are not “dissatisfied” with their NATO involvement. 
The fact that Serbia wants NATO membership is probably the best argument in this 
regard.  
2. NATO Perceived as Seeking Ukrainian Territory  
A second stereotype, involving NATO’s purported plans to occupy and deploy 
troops in Ukraine territory, is also strong and actively exaggerated by those who spread 
anti-NATO propaganda. The Block of Natalia Vitrenko, which failed to win three percent 
of the vote in 2006 and thus does not qualify for a seat in Parliament, is extremely active 
in diffusing these fears. Hoping to regain its lost position, the Block is especially active in 
Eastern and Southern Ukraine, where ethnic Russians comprise a considerable share of 
the population. The Block is even more active than the Communist Party of Ukraine, 
which just barely amassed the three percent of the vote necessary for representation in the 
Parliament.  
In anti-NATO speeches, government opponents frequently accuse Ukrainian 
leaders of trying to bring NATO troops into the state and violating provisions of the 
Ukrainian Constitution that prohibit the stationing of foreign troops on Ukraine territory. 
However, the authors neglect several facts. First, a foreign military base already exists in 
Ukraine, belonging to the Russian Black Sea fleet. Second, people probably do not know 
that NATO has no permanent military force, only one which is offered by allies and 
partners and constituted specifically for the conduct of concrete military operations. Anti-
NATO propaganda neglects this information, so people hear about NATO only as a 
potential occupier. Again, insufficient knowledge about NATO and active distortion of 
facts play a negative role.  
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Another example of a distorted information campaign is the activity of the 
Russian Nationalist Youth Organization “Proryv” in the Crimean peninsula. Two 
deputies of the Russian Duma were declared persona non grata in Ukraine after they 
visited the Crimean peninsula and delivered speeches in support of “Proryv.” Funding 
sources for such organizations are difficult to track. However, the fact that their activities 
are backed by Russian politicians speaks for itself.  
3. NATO Membership Perceived as a Heavy Burden on the Budget 
The myth that NATO membership is a heavy economic burden also derives from 
anti-NATO propaganda. Although Ukraine demonstrates relatively steady economic 
development, the welfare of the average Ukrainian citizen remains poor. State social 
services are also in need of improvement. That is why arguments regarding a heavy 
economic burden from NATO membership, though false, catch the attention of average 
Ukrainians. Supposedly well-informed pseudo-analysts even proclaim that NATO 
membership will cost 92 billion hryvnias (roughly 19 billion U.S. dollars). Notably, they 
do not indicate the duration and type of such expenditures.101  
Again, poor awareness of NATO keeps the average Ukrainian from recognizing 
that national contributions to the NATO budget are fixed on the level of one-half to one 
percent of a nations’ military (but not social) expenditures. Real expenditures for the 
implementation of the State Program on Euro-Atlantic Integration are 204 million 
hryvnias (roughly 40 million U.S. dollars), which comes to approximately 60 kopecks 
(12 U.S. cents) per adult per month. Moreover, 90 percent of this is reimbursed by the 
United Nations Organization for Ukraine’s participation in international peacekeeping 
operations.102 Anti-NATO propagandists’ awareness of Ukrainian society's concerns and 
weak points helps them distort information to attract the attention of average citizens. 
Besides these three major stereotypes, there are weaker and more irrational ones, 
like the idea that neutrality is the best option for Ukraine. Only a well planned and 
smoothly conducted campaign that attracts public interest can help the average Ukrainian 
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to make a rational democratic choice. This in turn will help guarantee that anti-NATO 
myths and “fairytales” will not affect Ukrainians' decisions during the national 
referendum on NATO membership. 
D. RUSSIAN IMPACT ON NATO-UKRAINE RELATIONS AND PUBLIC 
OPINION 
As a clear example of how concerns about Russia influence public opinion, 80 
percent of Ukrainians are concerned about the possibility of worsening Russian-
Ukrainian relations if Ukraine joins NATO.103 Russia traditionally opposes any 
Ukrainian rapprochement with NATO and tries to influence Ukrainian foreign policy 
using leverage possible, including its natural gas supplies to Ukraine. When in April 2005 
NATO invited Ukraine to begin Intensified Dialogue, there was a surge of anger from 
Moscow and increased inflammatory statements by Russian politicians. The official 
Russian position was announced by Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov, who said, 
“We have said more than once that every country has the right to take sovereign 
decisions on who will be its partner in the international arena.” At the same time, he 
added that the acceptance into NATO of Ukraine would mean a colossal geopolitical 
shift, and Russia would assess its options based on its own national interests.104  
The official statement was followed by statements from other politicians who, 
unlike Lavrov, showed a lack of ethics and diplomacy. As a consequence, ten Russian 
politicians, including Vladimir Zhyrinovskii, a Vice Speaker of the Russian Duma, were 
declared “persona non grata” for their interference in Ukraine’s domestic affairs. The 
most staggering example of interference came with the arrival in Ukraine of another 
deputy in the Russian Parliament, Konstantin Zatulin, who actively participated in a 2006 
anti-NATO demonstration organized by the Block of Natalia Vitrenko. For this, he was 
given the same status as his colleague Zhyrinovskii.  
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Average Ukrainians worried about relations with Russia are not sufficiently aware 
of NATO-Russia cooperation. Improved awareness of the facts about Russian 
cooperation with NATO could significantly contribute to opening their eyes to the 
credibility of anti-NATO propaganda disseminated by Russian-backed groups. 
The facts demonstrate that Russia outdoes Ukraine in several important types of 
cooperation with NATO, even considering that Ukraine is in the process of Intensified 
Dialogue. So, unlike Ukraine's “26 plus 1” format of “consultations” with NATO, Russia 
participates in “making decisions” with the Alliance, specifically in the area of fighting 
terrorism. In contrast to five working groups functioning within the format of NATO-
Ukraine Commission (NUC), the NATO-Russia Council counts 20 working and expert 
groups.105 Other facts demonstrating practical cooperation between NATO and Russia 
would also surprise the poorly informed average Ukrainian. To cooperate in fighting 
terrorism, Russia allowed NATO aircraft to use its airspace for operations in Afghanistan. 
Within the same framework of cooperation, Russia and NATO have established 
mechanisms for intelligence information exchange. Based on the provisions of an Action 
Plan set up by the NATO-Russia Commission, Russia participates in the NATO 
antiterrorist operation “Active Endeavor” in the Mediterranean. In September 2006, the 
Russian corvette “Pytlivyi” patrolled the Mediterranean Sea jointly with the Turkish 
frigate “Geksu.” A Ukrainian role in the same operation, meanwhile, is limited by the 
contact point in Ukrainian Navy Headquarters in Sevastopol, and participation by the 
Ukrainian corvette “Ternopil” is still in the planning stages.   
It should also be mentioned that since June 2004, the Ukrainian Parliament has 
failed to ratify a Memorandum of Understanding allowing NATO access to Ukrainian 
airlift capacity. While the Ukrainian Parliament considered for two years whether it 
should make friends with NATO and ratify the memorandum, the Russian company  
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“Volga-Dnepr” took an interest in providing the same services for the Alliance. As a 
consequence, the Russian company provides 50 percent of airlift services requested by 
NATO. 
Other facts about NATO-Russia cooperation—Russia’s participation in NATO 
exercises, NATO’s support for the Program of Adaptation of the Russian Retired Officers 
at a rate of 400,000 Euro per year,106 etc.—also exemplify how the state can pursue 
national goals in cooperation with NATO. Russian cooperation with NATO might even 
serve as an example for Ukraine. 
Returning to how the Russian factor influences Ukrainian public opinion on 
NATO, anti-NATO propaganda is reflected in another very interesting fact. According to 
the polls, the share of Russian population with a negative image of NATO is 60 
percent.107 Considering that Ukrainians with similar views make up 65 percent of the 
population (five percent more than in Russia), the success of the anti-NATO propaganda 
campaign probably was a surprise even for its organizers.  
These realities point to the urgent need for an effective public information 
campaign about NATO. In the future, an objective description of NATO-Russian 
cooperation should probably be included in the Ukrainian State Program on Informing 
the Population on Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic Integration. Depicting the benefits to Russia 
from its active cooperation with NATO could show Ukrainian society why Russia so 
strongly resists any Ukrainian rapprochement with the Alliance. This would greatly 
contribute to the fight against anti-NATO propaganda and to reversing the NATO’s 
negative image among Ukrainians.  
E. CONCLUSION  
The negative image of NATO held by the majority of Ukrainians will block the 
main strategic goal of Ukrainian foreign policy, membership in NATO, even if all NATO  
 
 




members unanimously support Ukraine’s bid to join Alliance. This reinforces the fact 
that membership in NATO depends primarily on the state's willingness and ability to 
integrate into the organization.  
Negative public opinion means that a national referendum would probably fail, so 
reversing the negative image of NATO should be a priority for the state leadership. The 
task appears complicated because of multiple negative stereotypes of NATO. These 
stereotypes, nurtured by anti-NATO propaganda in Ukraine, will prevent the average 
Ukrainian from voting rationally in the referendum. A well-timed and smoothly run 
information campaign can show Ukrainians the sources and goals of anti-NATO 
propaganda. In response to anti-NATO propaganda, information on the scope of NATO-
Russia cooperation should be included in the information campaign. The information 
campaign so far has had unexpected negative consequences, including dramatic growth in 
opposition to NATO membership. Ukrainian authorities should learn a lesson from this, 
as continued failure to change public opinion in the near future might create an even 
greater problem: a turn back toward Russia that would preclude Ukraine's chances of 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. RESULTS OF THE RESEARCH 
Having begun gradual rapprochement with NATO since independence, Ukraine 
today faces considerable difficulties with its bid for NATO membership. While 
continuing to pursue an open door policy, NATO hesitates to invite Ukraine to the 
Membership Action Plan and does not see Ukraine as a potential member despite 
repeated statements by the President in favor of NATO membership and considerable 
democratic advances and reforms. The fact that more than half of Ukraine's population 
has a negative image of NATO aggravates the situation. If the negative perception of 
NATO by Ukrainians is not reversed, a national referendum on NATO membership will 
certainly fail. 
The problem of images in NATO-Ukraine relations can be explained by turning to 
the politico-psychological realm of international relations. The chronology of NATO-
Ukraine relations shows how the evolution of Ukrainian foreign policy motivations and 
changes in its international behavior changed how the Alliance perceived Ukraine. 
Changes in the image of Ukraine, from a near-degenerate to a partner and probable ally, 
are reflected in changed cooperation formats proposed by NATO over the history of the 
NATO-Ukraine relationship.  
The fact that NATO does not see Ukraine as an ally is caused by Ukraine's 
internal political instability, which is reflected in unclear foreign policy motivations and 
international behavior. The legitimacy of statements by Ukraine’s President Yushchenko 
asserting the high priority given to joining NATO is regularly undermined by Prime 
Minister Yanukovych, who is backed by the majority of the Ukrainian Parliament. 
Insofar as membership in NATO depends on the aspirant’s determination and ability to 
integrate fully into the organization, this uncertainty at home will surely prevent NATO 
from inviting Ukraine to NATO Membership Action Plan.  
Further institutionalization of Ukraine’s relations with other Western democracies 
is crucially important for the state’s self-concept and development as an independent 
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stable democracy. NATO’s Open Door policy represents a unique opportunity for 
Ukraine in this regard. Unless it is integrated into NATO and the EU, Ukraine risks a 
return to political, economic and military domination by Russia. 
Practically speaking, Russian domination would eliminate Ukraine as an 
independent state and international actor. The U.S. and Poland, the main advocates for 
Ukraine’s membership in NATO, have several times expressed concerns in this regard. 
Guided in relations with Kyiv by their foreign strategy and conscious interests, American 
and Polish leaders continually stress their hope that Ukraine will be a strong and 
independent state fully integrated into NATO and their willingness to provide 
considerable support toward this goal. At the same time, they encourage the EU and its 
key members to keep the European Union door open for Ukraine as well. Without 
Western European support for Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic endeavors, political and economic 
assistance to Kyiv from Washington and Warsaw will remain inefficient. 
Major European powers' reluctance to see Ukraine as a NATO ally and EU 
member derives from their resistance to NATO transformation and enlargement. France 
and Germany's unwillingness to accept Ukraine in NATO and EU to the detriment to 
relations with Russia is another serious obstacle. Further marginalization of Ukraine 
would undermine the legitimacy of EU's support for democracy and raise the general 
question of the “finalité Européenne.”108 Moreover, marginalization of Ukraine creates 
favorable conditions for Russia to extend its political and economic influence to the 
eastern borders of the EU. Would this be beneficial for the European Union? It is a big 
question.  
However, unanimity within the members of NATO would not guarantee Ukraine 
NATO membership if another major problem, the distorted and negative image of NATO 
held by Ukrainian society, is not resolved. Active anti-NATO propaganda, the main 
cause of NATO's poor public image, nurtures stereotypes and fears about Ukraine's  
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integration into the Alliance which preclude a rational, conscious decision in the required 
national referendum. Efforts by the Ukrainian government to inform the public about 
Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration have obviously failed. 
B. THE WAY AHEAD 
The future of Ukraine as an independent state is in question. That is why full 
integration into NATO and the EU should remain Ukraine’s top foreign policy priority. 
Resolving problems related to joining NATO is primarily Ukraine's responsibility. 
However, without the support of NATO and EU members, Ukrainian intentions risk 
failure.  
How Ukraine is perceived by NATO will block NATO membership even if all 
membership oriented reforms are successfully implemented. Overcoming Ukraine's 
internal political instability and maintaining the dynamics of comprehensive internal 
reform are crucially important. 
Given the tension between negative public views toward NATO and Ukrainian 
leaders' drive to insure NATO membership, reversing NATO's negative image must be 
priority so that anti-NATO propagandists do not continue to exert a negative impact. The 
importance of the “Russian factor” on public opinion suggests that Russia's active 
cooperation with NATO should be a focus of the public information campaign.  
Ukraine must take full advantage of strong support from the U.S. and Poland, lest 
the Western countries develop “Ukraine’s fatigue” like in 2000-2001 during Kuchma's 
rule. The experience of Poland and other new NATO members should be thoroughly 
studied by Ukrainian authorities and experts. 
Given the ambivalence of key European allies, Ukraine should reinvigorate 
dialogue with the European powers. If the European door to NATO remains closed, 
Ukraine's main foreign policy priority will not be achieved.  
Ukraine’s path to Euro-Atlantic integration is a rocky one. The situation is 
difficult but not hopeless. Of course, Western support is crucial. At the same time, 
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